

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

July 30, 2021

TO: Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director
FROM: Z. C. McCabe Resident Inspector
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Activity Report for Week Ending July 30, 2021

Tank Farms: **Tank Farms:** The resident inspector (RI) observed the pre-job brief and start of a sludge transfer from Tank 40 to the Low Point Pump Pit. The RI found the pre-job brief to be thorough. Prior to initiating the transfer, the procedure requires review and approval from the Shift Operations Manager (SOM) and Shift Technical Engineer (STE) to ensure all preparations have been completed and the facility is not currently in any limiting conditions for operation (LCOs). When the SOM and STE reviewed the procedure neither physically checked the status of the facility. After they completed their review the RI asked what they did to complete that step. Both informed the RI that they were able to complete the step from memory (reviewed previously in the shift to support the transfer) and then identified ways they could review the status if necessary. This practice has resulted in technical safety requirement (TSR) violations in the past. In this instance, there were no active LCOs that would have prohibited the transfer. The RI discussed these and other observations with SRR management and confirmed that the actions of the SOM and STE met the expectation for reviewing active LCOs prior to starting a transfer.

Solid Waste Management Facility: During a review of a completed procedure (performed several days prior) for transporting transuranic waste from one pad to another, an under instruction (U/I) SOM identified that the First Line Manager (FLM) pre-checks which included several TSR implementing steps had not be completed. The procedure has three sections, “5.1: FLM Pre-Mining Checks,” “5.2: Mining Compliant Containers” and “5.3: Container Transport and Placement.” The evolution did not involve mining containers, only transporting containers via section 5.3. However, the “Applicability” section of the procedure dictates that section 5.1 be performed every time the procedure is used. Upon discovery, the U/I SOM contacted the FLM who was unaware that the pre-checks were necessary for this evolution. The U/I SOM and FLM confirmed that the evolution was compliant with the TSRs. The FLM then performed section 5.1 and completed it and signed with the date of the evolution. During an issue review, the FLM explained that this was his first time completing this procedure without performing section 5.2. He also mentioned that the procedure reader asked about performing section 5.1 due to the note in the “Applicability” section, to which the FLM responded that it was not necessary. The corrective actions include drafting a site wide lessons learned, an extent of condition review of similar procedures and to evaluate changing the name of section 5.1.

C-Area: Last week the RI walked down 105-C with SRNS personnel. As a result of the RI’s observations (see 7/2/21 report), SRNS personnel defaced the two unofficial operator aids and are planning to make training improvements to ensure personnel know where to measure the sump level. Additionally, SRNS personnel performed dose rate measurements of one of the High Radiation Areas (HRA) and the area that was posted as 200 mrem/hr without HRA controls. The dose rates have significantly reduced since the last measurements (over 20 years ago) and SRNS has posted the areas appropriately. SRNS personnel are also planning to address other legacy issues in the facility (e.g., removing old signage requiring actions that are no longer performed) based on the RI’s observations.