

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 12, 2021

TO: Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director
FROM: Z. C. McCabe, Resident Inspector
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Activity Report for Week Ending November 12, 2021

Staff Activity: R. Eul and R. Wu of the Board's technical staff were onsite this week to support the staff review of sustained operations at the Salt Waste Processing Facility and to complete training.

L-Area: During a routine review of training records, operations personnel identified that they had recently performed a procedure validation despite not being qualified to do so. The L-Area Procedure Owner/Validation qualification requires that personnel qualified on the equipment must complete a separate training course and a Job Performance Measure (JPM) in order to validate procedures associated with that equipment. In this case, the training had been completed but the JPM had not. Contributing to the issue was unclear distinction in the Learning Management System between "trained" and "qualified" status for operators. The facility called a timeout, performed an extent of condition review to determine how many additional procedures were affected, placed affected procedures on Administrative Hold pending re-validation, and convened an issue investigation. A total of 54 procedures were identified to have been validated by unqualified operators. All have been re-validated by qualified operators since the identification of the issue and normal operations have resumed. Several of the affected procedures included Technical Safety Requirement surveillances. Facility personnel indicated that completed surveillance records were reviewed, including logs and associated data, with no issues noted.

Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF): The shift operations manager (SOM) authorized the installation of a complex lockout to support the replacement of the drive end fan bearings on Fan 402A. After the lockout was established, the SOM went to log the dates in the SWPF Lockout/Tagout Index Sheet, a running list of all lockouts at SWPF. Upon doing so, the SOM noted that the lockout had already been marked as established and removed in August of this year. After further investigation, SWPF personnel identified that the date in the Index Sheet predates the initial draft of the lockout in question. Thus, they were able to conclude that dates were recorded in August in the incorrect location. SWPF personnel were confident that no work had been completed without proper hazardous energy controls.

H-Canyon: During the development of revision 18 of the H-Canyon Documented Safety Analysis, H-Canyon personnel noted a nonconservative error in the input and assumption document that also impacts the recently submitted but not yet approved revision 17. The postulated evaporator explosion event analysis impacted by the error will likely have higher calculated dose consequences to co-located worker and public, which may lead to the need for additional credited controls. H-Canyon personnel are revising revision 17 for re-submittal to DOE-SR.