

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 4, 2022

**TO:** Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director  
**FROM:** A. Boussouf and D. Gutowski, Resident Inspectors  
**SUBJECT:** Los Alamos Activity Report for the Week Ending November 4, 2022

**Staff Activity:** Members of the Board's staff participated in a virtual briefing with the Board, DOE/NNSA Headquarters, and the Los Alamos Field Office to discuss DOE's response to the January 6, 2022 letter addressing concerns with the adequacy of LANL's Transportation Safety Document and the onsite transportation safe harbors in 10 CFR 830.

**Plutonium Facility–Infrastructure:** This week, facility personnel held a meeting to discuss concerns with scaffolding. Workers had discovered several quality issues on a scaffold that had been erected and released for work. During the meeting, participants noted that the pre-job inspection process is not well defined, and that workers rely on skill of the craft rather than written criteria when releasing an erected scaffold for work. Given the large number of ongoing construction activities, facility personnel plan to re-evaluate the scaffold inspection criteria and are considering increased use of an existing checklist for each pre-job inspection.

**N3B–Stop Work:** Last week, N3B released several activities that had been previously stopped (see 10/14/22 report). The resumed activities included transuranic waste container movements to support mining, characterization, remediation, and shipping, as well as the central characterization program's performance demonstrations. In addition, transfers for weight certification, nondestructive assay/examination, and shipments to the RANT facility were resumed.

This week, N3B resumed shipping mixed low level waste, repackaging waste liner from one of the domes, and overpacking waste containers. Currently, corrugated metal pipe retrieval, drill and drain, dome reskinning, and activities requiring lockout tagout are still stopped.

**Safety Basis:** On Tuesday, Triad transmitted its methodology for calculating leak path factor and atmospheric dispersion to the NNSA Field Office for review and concurrence. This methodology will be part of the mitigated accident analysis in the new TA55 Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) being developed using DOE-STD-3009-2014, *Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis*. The new methodology couples the leak path factor and atmospheric dispersion factor. In addition, the analysis would increase the wind direction resolution from 8 points to 16 points and provide more granularity at lower wind speeds.

On Wednesday, the NNSA Field Office approved the Technical Area (TA) 55-DSA-2020-R1 Addendum 4, and the TA55-TSR-2020-R2, Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) with no conditions of approval or direction. The addendum addressed changes to equipment in the Plutonium Facility to accommodate activities currently performed in the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building. This will require adding gloveboxes and equipment for multiple processes including dry powder handling, material characterization and analytical chemistry, machining, casting and molten operations, and primary confinement.