

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

July 13, 2007

**TO:** K. Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** R. Quirk and W. Linzau, Hanford Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Activity Report for the Week Ending July 13, 2007

Richland Operations Office (RL): D. Brockman has been named the Manager of RL replacing K. Klein who retired in May. Brockman was the Federal Project Director for the K Basins Closure.

K Basins Closure (KBC): The site rep completed walkdowns of the K West Basin to view the status of bulk sludge containerization. The areas observed generally had sludge levels less than a quarter of an inch deep, including under the equipment still in the basin (see Hanford Activity Report dated 7/6/07). RL and contractor management propose to remove the debris and vacuum the sludge below the equipment during the final pass sludge containerization effort. RL has commitments to complete the final pass containerization in January 2008.

Tank Farms: Earlier this week, engineering approved operating the evaporator with a non-safety interlock bypassed because it was no longer required and the associated instrumentation had erratic indications. The vice-president of Waste Feed Operations had to direct that repairs be made and the interlock restored and agreed with the site rep that bypassing interlocks is inconsistent with good nuclear safety practices.

River Corridor Closure Project: During a review of the Vital Safety Systems Notebook, the facility representative noted a discrepancy in fire system testing records for Building 327. Further investigation revealed that a similar condition existed in Building 324. The testing had been scheduled but had to be delayed due to scheduling and coordination conflicts between the facilities and the Hanford Fire Department (HFD), which performs the fire system maintenance and testing. The HFD is working to bring the systems back into full compliance and contractor management is developing a database to better track completion of the required fire system maintenance.

The site rep met with managers of the 618-7 burial ground project to discuss safety analysis of the hazards associated with remediation activities. Considerable effort is being directed to analyze the hazards at the boundary of the burial ground and at nearby Route 4. The site rep questioned why all the postulated types of waste were not being considered in the analysis and why a hydrogen deflagration was not considered credible.

Waste Treatment Plant (WTP): The project proposed placing acceptance criteria that limit particle size and density of the waste delivered from the tank farms. A small percentage of the tank waste will not remain suspended during pumping from the receipt tanks in the Pretreatment Facility. The Office of River Protection and the WTP and Tank Farms contractors are discussing options to ensure proper plant operations.