

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

April 6, 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: M. J. Merritt, DNFSB Site Representative
SUBJECT: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)
Report for Week Ending April 6, 2007

Readiness Assessment for Legacy Item Disposition: LLNL is nearing the completion of closure packages that address the pre-start findings from the Livermore Site Office (LSO) readiness assessment (RA) to disposition the legacy item referred to as Object-77. The LSO RA identified two pre-start findings, one in the area of training, and the other related to inadequate plans to transition from dry runs to actual radiological operations. NMTP training has developed a draft training matrix to identify the necessary training and qualification requirements for fissile material handlers and support personnel. Plutonium Facility management has also been working with programmatic personnel to develop a draft startup plan to identify the necessary prerequisites to transition from mockup training to actual disposition activities. Development of both the startup plan and the training matrix has been slow considering the disposition schedule. Additional management involvement may be necessary to ensure that activities supporting preparation for this activity are properly integrated. Closure of the pre-start findings will be confirmed by LLNL and the LSO line management. Disposition of Object-77 is expected to occur in early May.

Plutonium Facility - Potential Inadequacy in the Safety Analysis (PISA): On March 26, 2007, LLNL management declared a positive unreviewed safety question (USQ) to LSO regarding a PISA on a discrepant as-found condition in the Plutonium Facility. The USQ and PISA were reported because insufficient evidence (calculations) existed to ensure that the 7,500 gallon fire water tank could meet the functional requirements described in the current Safety Analysis Report (SAR). The fire suppression system functional requirements will be redefined in the new Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) to better describe the performance that is expected. The fire suppression system requirements will transition from the SAR to the DSA in the near future.

Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Occurrence: RHWM facilities management declared an occurrence in the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) after potentially suspect/counterfeit parts were discovered in facility equipment (Occurrence Report LLNL-LLNL-2007-0070). The parts in question were shackles and clips used to lift lids from radioactive waste containers. Subsequent evaluation indicated that the parts may not be suspect/counterfeit, however, there may be discrepancies in the vendor's compliance with the terms and conditions of the procurement agreement.

LSO Senior Nuclear Safety Advisor: In early March, NNSA re-posted the job announcement to fill a Senior Nuclear Safety Advisor vacancy at LSO. The position was originally posted in May, and re-posted in July and October. The posting closed on March 30, 2007.