

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

May 25, 2007

**TO:** J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** R. Todd Davis/Donald Owen, Oak Ridge Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Activity Report for Week Ending May 25, 2007

A. Building 9212 Annual Assessment. This week, the staff and site reps. discussed with YSO and BWXT personnel the site plans and progress in responding to the Board's letter dated March 13, 2007. This letter requested NNSA to provide an annual assessment of the adequacy of the Building 9212 Complex to support continued safe operations with an initial briefing within 6 months (i.e., September 2007) on how NNSA will conduct this annual assessment. The site has established a joint YSO and BWXT team to formulate a plan for the assessment. YSO and BWXT personnel noted that they are evaluating existing sources of facility information (e.g., vital safety system health, system availability, maintenance backlog) to utilize for this assessment. Based on these sources, the assessment team will identify the gaps that require additional actions to support the assessment. The staff and site reps. noted that the assessment may require additional evaluation of the physical condition of facility process systems where degradation could have safety implications.

B. Conduct of Operations. As reported on March 30<sup>th</sup>, YSO management had formally noted their concern regarding the lack of proper Conduct of Operations evident in several events. YSO management had requested to meet with BWXT management to discuss Conduct of Operations and actions to reverse the trend of deficiencies. BWXT management presented an update on the response to YSO's request this week.

BWXT management noted that improper procedural adherence and lack of conservative decision making or questioning attitude have been present in many of the events. Prior actions related to these factors under the Conduct of Operations improvement initiative (see the 3/16/07 site rep. report) have been completed. BWXT management noted a recent increase of self-identified issues indicating some improved decision making and questioning attitude; however, BWXT considers that further action is necessary to provide additional focus on proper procedural adherence. BWXT intends to require either step-by-step sign-off or reader/worker use of procedures for an interim period on new or revised procedures. BWXT intends that production and facility management will also employ those protocols in other instances at their discretion (e.g., after an event involving lack of procedural adherence). Several other actions noted by BWXT include requiring increased management operational assessment/oversight, improving communications across all nuclear facilities (e.g., a forum for all shift managers), and improving the process to validate an individual's training for an operation. BWXT management indicated that any additional needed actions would be identified over the next few months.

C. Special Material Capability Project. In October, NNSA approved Critical Decision-2 (performance baseline) and Critical Decision-3A (procure long lead equipment) for the special material capability project (see the 10/20/06 site rep. report). This project will install a new negative-pressure glovebox and filtered exhaust systems in a Y-12 facility. Earlier this month, a design review was conducted by YSO and BWXT. Completion of design and approval of Critical Decision-3 (approve start of construction) is now projected by September.