

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

July 8, 2005

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** Michael J. Merritt, DNFSB Site Representative  
**SUBJECT:** Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory  
Report for Week Ending July 8, 2005

**Plutonium Facility Conduct of Operations:** During the past several weeks, the site representative and the Livermore Site Office (LSO) Facility Representative have observed numerous instances of poor conduct of operations in the Plutonium Facility. Most cases involved a failure on the part of facility personnel to follow procedures. In the most recent case, facility personnel did not respond immediately to a continuous air monitor alarm in a laboratory room. The alarm was also not properly recorded in the facility alarm log. On other occasions, the Facility Representative has identified numerous deficiencies in the recording of facility data in logs as required by facility procedures.

On June 29, 2005, the LSO Manager issued a letter to LLNL expressing concern with the procedural violations. LSO noted that the recent events were similar to observations made by an independent oversight inspection last fall that found that facility personnel did not apply sufficient rigor or attention to detail in following safety requirements. As a result of the inspection, LLNL instituted compensatory measures for the administrative control program for procedures. LSO stated that it expects LLNL to pay particular attention to these conduct of operation issues during the on-going facility management self-assessment.

**Emergency Management Inspection:** On June 29, 2005, DOE's Office of Emergency Management Oversight (OA-30) provided an exit briefing to present the results of its emergency management inspection at LLNL. The OA-30 team praised LLNL for improvements made since previous visits. However, many of the program improvements have not yet been fully implemented. The aspects of the emergency management program that require the most improvement are:

- Hazards survey and assessments;
- Training, drills and exercises; and
- Feedback and improvement.

A final report with the detailed observations is expected in August. Once the report is issued, LLNL will have 30 days to develop an interim corrective actions plan, and 60 days for a final corrective action plan.

**NNSA Oversight:** NNSA's Chief of Defense Nuclear Safety (CDNS) conducted a review of Plutonium Facility resumption issues on July 5-7, 2005. The CDNS received briefings on the resumption effort and was informed that a declaration of readiness by LLNL could occur as early as late July. The declaration will be followed by a readiness assessment performed by LLNL and LSO.