

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

MEMO TO: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: Timothy Hunt and Dave Kupferer, Pantex Site Representatives
DATE: Friday, August 26, 2005
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Weekly Report

Credited Tooling Documentation: During a brief to the Board in March 2005, BWXT and PXSO communicated that special tooling with credited safety features would have all pertinent supporting documentation complete by June 2005. The functional analyses (e.g., 3:1/5:1 safety factors, tripping man, seismic) and Design Requirement Documents (DRD), which document the implementation of credited tooling features, are currently not expected to be completed for all credited tooling until after the NNSA tooling review next month. Approximately 150 DRDs still need to be evaluated through the unreviewed safety question process. Tooling and Machine Design has prioritized a subset of about 90 tools that need documentation completed before the NNSA tooling review. All credited tools presently authorized for use remain in service even though many supporting analyses and DRDs are not in final form.

W56 Program Suspension: W56 dismantlement operations remain suspended pending design agency analysis of new information pertaining to electrostatic discharge (ESD) hazards. The weapon response is expected to indicate that the sensitivity of the component to ESD is greater than originally thought. If further design agency analysis can not discount the probability of the newly identified ESD hazard, a technical solution will be needed that could possibly include tooling redesign.

B83 Seamless Safety for the Twenty-First Century (SS-21): The B83 program review team held its quarterly meeting at Pantex this week to discuss status, schedule, and issues. Of particular concern was the uncertainty associated with the January 2006 SS-21 start-up date cited in Issue J of the Integrated Weapons Activity Plan. Some of the team members stated they are working toward what they assume to be more realistic dates in the March-April timeframe. Until the W56 weapon response is completed, a date for the design agency review of the B83 SS-21 Hazard Analysis Report cannot be determined. The subsequent readiness assessments and authorization basis updates are delayed indefinitely at this point.

NNSA Fire Protection Assessment: This week, NNSA conducted an independent line oversight review of the contractor's fire protection program to evaluate the effectiveness with which BWXT has implemented contractual requirements for fire protection into nuclear explosive operations. The scope of the review included configuration management, system designs, flow down of safety basis requirements into procedures, self-assessment program, and program compatibility with Nuclear Explosive Safety Master Studies requirements. The most significant finding was that BWXT fire protection engineers do not meet their qualification standards.

Emergency Management Inspection: The Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance (OA) recently conducted an emergency management review at Pantex that evaluated improvements since its 2002 inspection, PXSO program management, and limited-scope performance tests of emergency response decision-making. The general conclusion was that the Pantex emergency management program has improved markedly since 2002 but that PXSO and BWXT line management attention is needed to address implementation weaknesses in the hazardous materials screening process and to improve formulation of protective actions.