

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 8, 2006

TO: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: R. Todd Davis/Donald Owen, Oak Ridge Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Activity Report for Week Ending September 8, 2006

Mr. Owen was at the Savannah River Site this week to observe the contractor Operational Readiness Review for the Tritium Extraction Facility.

A. Building 9212 Facility Risk Review. As a part of responding to the Board's November 28, 2005 letter concerning seismic vulnerabilities for Building 9212, YSO committed to performing a risk-based prioritization of potential facility upgrades. Earlier this year, YSO proposed expanding this assessment to include evaluation of other safety systems that may require upgrades to support facility operations until the Uranium Processing Facility is operational (see the 3/10/06 site rep. report). Based on recent site rep. discussions with YSO, the Facility Risk Review now includes evaluation of process systems to ensure they are capable of reliably reducing material at risk and meeting mission requirements.

The overall purpose of the Facility Risk Review is to identify upgrades and compensatory measures necessary to ensure continued safety of operations in Building 9212 for 15 years. After the proposed safety and process system upgrades are identified, YSO plans to integrate them to produce a prioritized project list. A Project Execution Plan will be developed based on this list that will address Building 9212 upgrades over the next 15 years. YSO and BWXT are in the process of executing this risk review and plan to brief the Board on the results in October 2006.

B. Quality Evaluation Relocation. BWXT has now satisfactorily completed integrated functional testing of the linear quality evaluation glovebox in the Assembly/Disassembly Building. Operator training and procedure validation is on-going. Recently, BWXT conducted an Implementation Validation Review (IVR) for the safety basis controls associated with this quality evaluation activity. The IVR team identified three pre-implementation findings concerning safety basis consistency with the Fire Hazards Analysis and criticality requirements. These findings are being resolved. The BWXT Readiness Assessment for startup of this glovebox is planned for early October.

C. Potential Inadequacy in the Safety Analysis. On Thursday, BWXT declared a Potential Inadequacy in the Safety Analysis at the Warehouse and the Metalworking Building because of the potential for higher quantities of a certain material in the facility than is identified in the safety analysis. In the Documented Safety Analysis for these facilities, BWXT identified maximum allowable limits for several materials that could impact workers and the public during accident scenarios. Recently, during implementation of a new procedure for tracking these materials at the Warehouse, new information was identified that indicates a significantly higher quantity of one particular material is present than is currently analyzed. BWXT is evaluating whether this issue represents an Unreviewed Safety Question for these facilities.