

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

July 28, 2006

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** J. S. Contardi/M.T. Sautman, SRS Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** SRS Report for Week Ending July 28, 2006

**DNFSB Activity:** The Site Rep briefed the local Savannah River Site Citizens Advisory Board on the mission of the DNFSB as well as on nuclear material stabilization and storage at SRS.

**Solid Waste Management Facility:** The Container Management Plan (CMP) requires additional drum vents for high plutonium-equivalent-curie drums. The contractor identified that they had violated their Justification for Continued Operations because they had previously moved two under vented drums onto a pad. This happened because the process for developing and reviewing operating procedures did not ensure that the CMP requirements were adequately incorporated. Operations were suspended until the operating procedures were revised, as necessary, to fully implement the CMP.

The starter of a truck transporting 24 transuranic waste drums overheated and started to smoke. While a worker used a portable fire extinguisher to put out a very small fire in the engine and the drums were safely transferred to another vehicle, the Savannah River Site Operations Center/Fire Department was not notified of the fire until about an hour later.

**Calibration Laboratory:** As a result of recent issues (Site Rep July 14 and 21 weekly reports), the contractor conducted an independent assessment of the facility's operations. The assessment findings indicate less than adequate implementation of integrated safety management, unclear roles and responsibilities for line managers, and less than adequate job planning practices.

**H Tank Farms:** During a flush of the tank 37 transfer line, liquid waste migrated into the steam line, causing parts of this above ground line to read 30 rem/hr on contact. An engineering investigation determined that the heated water in the transfer line caused a siphon to form while it was soaking. Engineers have developed actions to preclude this from recurring.

**Saltstone:** Clean grout accumulated in a section of the pump suction piping that had a wider diameter. The accumulation eventually broke free and plugged much of the pipe. While the plug has been removed and the piping redesigned, this event would have been much more difficult to recover from if actual liquid waste was being processed at the time.

**Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ):** H Canyon declared a positive USQ because the leak path factor could increase after a design basis earthquake.

**Walkdowns:** The Site Reps walked down the Modular Caustic-Side Solvent Extraction Unit (MCU) facility, the K-Area Interim Surveillance project (KIS), and the F-Canyon Transuranic Waste Drum Repackaging activity. All major vessels, including the centrifugal contactor skid, have been installed at MCU and construction should be complete this winter.

**FB-Line:** DOE announced the completion of deactivation activities for the FB-Line facility.