DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 3, 2004

TO: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director

FROM: R. Todd Davis/Donald Owen, Oak Ridge Site Representatives

SUBJ: Activity Report for Week Ending December 3, 2004

A. <u>Building 9212 Electrical Fire - Update.</u> As reported on November 21, 2003 and December 19, 2003, a small electrical fire occurred in an electrical panel in Building 9212. Investigation revealed that the panel had a number of electrical non-conformances and little or no maintenance had been performed over the years. In December 2003, BWXT started thermal imaging and non-intrusive visual inspection of electrical panels in Building 9212 and at other nuclear and balance-of-plant facilities, prioritized by age/risk. The site reps. recently inquired on actions since December 2003 in addressing the issue site-wide. Thermal imaging and non-intrusive visual inspection was completed in October for the major nuclear facilities at Y-12; approximately 1200 electrical panels were inspected. Of these, four panels required immediate lock-out based on thermal imaging. An additional 133 panels in major nuclear facilities have been selected to perform follow-on intrusive inspections (lock-out the panel and inspect all circuitry). The schedule for completing the intrusive inspections was noted to the site reps. by BWXT personnel as September 2005; however, the BWXT corrective action tracking schedules subsequently provided to the site reps. indicates September 2006. The site reps. inquired on this discrepancy with Y-12 management.

- B. Near-Miss Electrical Update. As discussed last week, BWXT completed their investigation of a recent electrical near-miss where a technician performing a radiological survey of an overhead crane had contacted an energized 480-volt bus. The investigation report is now available. Among several causal factors highlighted was use of a generic Job Hazard Analysis for radiological surveys that alone does not identify specific hazards for a given survey. Also highlighted was lack of identification of this non-routine survey on the facility Plan of the Day (POD), lack of identification of the survey at the POD meeting, and lack of walkdown to identify any job hazards. Primary among the report's Judgements of Need was the need to revise the Y-12 Integrated Safety Management System description (and sub-tier manuals and practices) to specifically address support/services work (surveys, inspections, etc.). The site reps. will follow development of corrective actions.
- C. Oxide Conversion Facility. An integrated run was completed this week and issues leading to suspension of the contractor Operational Readiness Review (ORR) in early October (see October 8th report) are considered by BWXT to be resolved. BWXT plans to resume the contractor ORR on December 6th.
- D. Quality Evaluation Relocation. As part of consolidation of material and reduction of security area footprint at Y-12, BWXT has begun planning a major project to relocate the Quality Evaluation (QE) activities from the Quality Evaluation building to the Assembly/Disassembly building. Over the next two months, BWXT will remove unused processing equipment in the Assembly/Disassembly building to provide space. The current plan is to relocate the existing QE gloveboxes; however, BWXT is considering a new glovebox. The decision will be based on a cost-benefit analysis and the programmatic impact of limited QE capabilities while the gloveboxes are being relocated. The preliminary BWXT schedule is to relocate and startup the first glovebox by March 2006 with all QE relocation complete late in 2006.