DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

May 28, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: T. Hunt and W. White, Pantex Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending May 28, 2004

Tooling Maintenance. An enhanced transportation cart (ETC-I) with an expired maintenance sticker was used again in a production bay. This occurrence was very similar to an event reported by the site reps in the May 7, 2004, weekly report. A weapon unit was loaded into an ETC-I before the expired sticker was noticed. Shortly before the maintenance sticker was due to expire, a tooling person had been tasked to complete the required maintenance, but the ETC-I was loaded with a different unit at the time, precluding performance of the inspection activity. Responsible personnel never followed up to make sure the inspection was done or tag the cart out of service before the sticker expiration date.

Corrective actions from the previous incident did not prevent this recurrence. A recall program for the ETC-I identified a need to complete the required inspection. However, after the initial failed attempt to perform the inspection, no one followed up to complete the inspection or tag out the cart after it became accessible. In addition, the effort to communicate to the production technicians after the first occurrence the importance of verifying the expiration date on each maintenance sticker was unsuccessful. [I, E1, P3A]

W62 Tooling Issue: BWXT identified this week that a required in-service inspection (ISI) for a design feature in the *Technical Safety Requirements for Pantex Facilities* (TSRs) had not been flowed down adequately. Detonator covers (design feature G.B.5) used while transporting the nuclear explosive in an ETC-II require an ISI to test the electrical properties of the covers prior to initial use on each W62. This ISI was not captured in the drawings associated with one type of detonator cover and was not done. In addition, the required frequency for the ISIs was not captured in the operating procedures or in the tooling drawings for any of the covers used. The flow-down error was detected when the W62 process engineer attempted to procure new covers.

BWXT is creating or revising support data sheets for the detonator covers used to reflect the ISIs and the required frequency for the ISIs. BWXT is also revising the W62 operating procedures to reflect that the covers can be used only with a single unit before having the required ISIs redone. The inadequate flow down was missed by the readiness verification, contractor readiness assessment, and NNSA readiness assessment for the W62 program. [I, W4]

B83 Readiness Assessment. Based on an engineering response received in February 2004 indicating potential concerns with certain scenarios during B83 operations, BWXT suspended operations on the program. A limited-scope contractor readiness assessment (RA) and an NNSA RA to verify the implementation of controls put in place to address the scenarios were recently completed. The NNSA RA team identified issues with the proceduralization of protective equipment information and documentation of training on safety requirements. Disassembly and inspection operations with the new controls could resume as early as next week. [I, M6]