

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

March 8, 2002

TO: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: Matt Forsbacka, Oak Ridge Site Representative
SUBJ: Activity Report for Week Ending March 8, 2002

Staff members C. Coones, M. Feldman, and M. Helfrich and outside expert R. West were on site this week to review Y-12 Building 9212, Enriched Uranium Operations (EUO) Wet Chemistry restart activities.

A. Y-12 Building 9206 Operational Readiness Review (ORR): The NNSA ORR for the pyrophoric material stabilization process was completed on Friday. The ORR team stressed the importance of rigorously maintaining high levels of training and disciplined interfaces with service organizations for future deactivation projects. Key among the two prestart and two poststart findings were that a) the storage cage for the final product needs to be specified and the technical basis for the cage needs to be established and b) the process for documenting and tracking surveillance results needs to be improved. The NNSA ORR team concluded that the pyrophoric material stabilization process can be safely conducted after the closure of the prestart items. (3-A)

B. Highly Enriched Uranium Material Facility (HEUMF): On Friday, senior YAO and BWXT managers met with the NNSA Administrator in Washington, DC to discuss a path forward for making Critical Decision-1 for the construction of the HEUMF. At issue are the project's scope, budget, and evolving security conditions. (1-C)

C. Y-12 EUO Wet Chemistry Startup Preparations: EUO Wet Chemistry operations are being prepared for restart in October 2002. The Board staff conducted an on-site review to evaluate the progress in developing hazards analysis and controls. Several issues were noted that will require further review. BWXT has created a fire protection program for the B-1 Wing that uses numerous minor modifications and administrative controls to compensate for the lack of sprinkler protection in the area; however, this program appeared to lack sufficient actions to ensure compliance. BWXT personnel were unable to describe the methodology used to conduct the accident analyses for the fire scenarios in the Basis for Interim Operation (BIO). The methodology for assigning the consequence and frequency for accident analysis of wet chemistry processes is different than that used for previous systems and results in two different sets of tables for frequency, consequence, and risk assessment in the same BIO. (2-A)

D. Recommendation 2000-2 Phase II Assessments: The Phase II assessment for the Cell Off Gas (COG) confinement ventilation system for Oak Ridge National Laboratory Building 3019 commenced on Monday. The assessment team, consisting of personnel from YAO and DOE ORO, appeared to be well qualified to perform this technical review. The scope of the review reflected the guidance promulgated by DOE. The team received detailed briefings of the system, and conducted several walkdowns. The team observed some weaknesses in the configuration management process for replacement parts. Overall, it appears that the COG confinement ventilation system is operable and capable of performing its intended safety functions. The assessment team's final report is expected next week. (1-C)

cc: Board Members