

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

October 18, 2002

**TO:** J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** Tim Hunt, Y-12 Site Cognizant Engineer  
**SUBJ:** Activity Report for Week Ending October 18, 2002

Staff member J. Contardi and outside expert R. West were on site this week providing Site Representative coverage.

A. BWXT Y-12 EUO Wet Chemistry: The two phase contractor operational readiness review (CORR) for wet chemistry restart was completed on October 9, 2002. The CORR review team concluded that the wet chemistry operation was not ready for startup due to inadequate readiness preparations. The overall findings of the team are consistent with the October 3, 2002 Board letter regarding startup operations for wet chemistry. The review team cited three primary factors in their determination that EUO was not ready to proceed to the Department of Energy (DOE) ORR: 1) excessive use of simulation, 2) improper documentation and acceptance of noncompliant test results, and 3) ineffective actions on the part of EUO management to correct identified deficiencies. Another CORR, with an as yet undefined scope, will be executed later this year. (2-B)

B. BWXT Y-12 EUO Reduction: Analysis of the data from the first of six Phase II reduction vessel test runs has been completed. It has been determined that it is safe to perform the next run, which is expected during the week of October 21. The temperature sensitive lacquers used to measure the temperature on the outside and bottom of the reduction vessel indicated that temperatures were within expected limits. The pressure observed was significantly less than the calculated value, but was greater than those seen during the three Phase I runs. The pressure was not unexpected since this material contained the highest moisture content of any previous test run. A final thermal model evaluation report will be issued after the last test run. (2-B)

C. BWXT Y-12 Building 9204-4: The site rep toured Building 9204-4 to observe current operations. During the tour, BWXT personnel informed the site rep that an unusual event had occurred the previous afternoon during a quality evaluation operation. The event involved the ejection of an approximately 150 lb steel object during a machining evolution. The steel object traveled an estimated 15 ft before coming to rest on the floor of the facility. Due to the potential seriousness of the event, BWXT decided to report the incident as a near-miss occurrence. The outcome of the incident does not warrant a formal investigation, but due to the potential hazard, DOE has requested that a Type B-like investigation be performed by the contractor. (2-C)

D. 10 CFR 830 Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs): DOE requested BWXT accelerate the previously submitted schedule of 10 CFR 830 compliant DSA submissions to allow a more level loading of the review personnel. A revised submission proposes the acceleration of several DSAs by 1-2 months with all, except for the Building 9212 DSA, submitted by April 2003. BWXT proposed extending submission of the 9212 DSA until September 2004. This exemption request has been submitted to DOE Headquarters for approval. (2-A)