

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 1, 2002

**TO:** J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** Tim Hunt, Y-12 Site Cognizant Engineer  
**SUBJ:** Activity Report for Week Ending November 1, 2002

Staff member R.Rauch and outside expert R.West were on site this week providing Site Representative coverage.

A. BWXT Y-12 9212 C-1 Wing: A nuclear criticality safety deficiency occurred in C-1 Wing of Building 9212 when an out-of-specification residue can was moved from a storage array and weighed, contrary to the instructions on an attached posting. The posting, which restricted movement of the can, was facing away from personnel as it was removed from the storage rack and was not recognized until the operation was almost complete. The shift manager was immediately notified and he contacted a criticality safety engineer, who did not think initially that the violation should be categorized as a deficiency. Following discussions with the operators, the shift manager permitted operations to continue. When the criticality safety engineer subsequently determined that the violation was a deficiency, EUO management was notified and the task was suspended. A management critique was held the next day and corrective actions are currently being developed. (2A)

B. BWXT Y-12 EUO Reduction: The fifth reduction test run did not take place as scheduled this week because an updated surveillance of furnace controls had not been developed and performed. During the initial attempt to conduct the previous run in July 2002, an incorrect process temperature setpoint caused a premature shutdown of the process. The subsequent investigation found that the activated control had been misadjusted while implementing a change to the high temperature cutouts for the furnace. Although this error was not a safety violation, concern remained that a similar mistake could affect the high temperature control set points if work was performed on any of these instruments. A management review developed a corrective action plan, which included an action item to modify the surveillance of the high temperature controls and reperforming it. During the preparations for the fifth run, it was determined that the surveillance had not been updated and performed. (2C)