

# DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

August 30, 2002

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** W. White, Pantex Site Representative  
**SUBJECT:** Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending August 30, 2002

**DNFSB Activity Summary:** W. White was on site all week.

**DOE Assessment:** The DOE's Office of Environment, Safety and Health Evaluations (OA-50) visited the Pantex Plant this week to develop the scope for a detailed assessment later this year of Pantex operations. The assessment will be conducted in late October and early November. The assessment will evaluate a wide range of operational and programmatic activities at the Pantex Plant. These include operational performance in nuclear facilities, development of integrated safety management descriptions and policies, control of work by subcontractors, maintenance activities across the plant, BWXT assessment programs, corrective action tracking, the employee concerns program, etc. [II.A]

**Requirements for Safety-Related Systems:** DNFSB staff held a telephone conference with OASO and BWXT personnel on Thursday to discuss an issue raised in a staff report forwarded by the Board to NNSA on August 6, 2002. In response to changes in DOE orders, the issuance of the Nuclear Safety Management Rule, and Board Recommendation 98-2, the Pantex Plant has been engaged in an extensive effort to upgrade its authorization basis for nuclear operations. As part of this effort, plant systems have been reclassified as safety-class or safety-significant systems when they are relied upon to prevent or mitigate newly identified accident scenarios. During the initial staff review, it was not clear how these systems were being evaluated for reliability and availability in performing their newly identified safety functions.

BWXT is developing a plan to evaluate these systems against the requirements for new or modified systems in DOE Order 420.1A, *Facility Safety*. BWXT will identify where existing systems fail to meet the requirements for new or modified systems in the order and will either justify the difference or develop a plan to upgrade the system. BWXT briefed the staff that they expect the plan for doing these evaluations to be complete in October 2002. [II.A]

**W84 Restart:** On August 20, 2002, BWXT submitted a startup notification report (SNR) to OASO concerning the restart of W84 disassembly and inspection operations at the Pantex Plant. W84 operations have not been conducted at Pantex since 1998. No documented safety analysis for the W84 program exists, and no changes to the existing W84 disassembly and inspection process are planned prior to restarting operations. The nuclear explosive safety study for this program, approved in 1993, has been administratively extended until January 2003. The W84 procedures will be updated to incorporate new site-wide controls, such as those for fire protection and lightning protection. The SNR identifies a BWXT readiness assessment in September 2002 with an NNSA readiness assessment to follow in October. The seamless safety (SS-21) upgrade for the W84 program is scheduled for completion in 2005. [II.A]

**Building 12-64 Seismic Concerns:** On Monday, OASO personnel met with BWXT to discuss the path forward for resolving seismic concerns with the use of Building 12-64 for nuclear explosive operations. The agreed path forward is to forgo additional analysis of the potential issue in favor of identifying an upgrade option to resolve the concern. This technical fix, which has not yet been identified, would attempt to address the issue of the delamination of the concrete cover of the roof during a seismic event. [II.A]