## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 8, 2002

**TO:** J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director

**FROM:** D. F. Owen, RFETS Site Representative

**SUBJECT:** RFETS Activity Report for the Week Ending February 8, 2002

Staff members R. E. Tontodonato, T. L. Hunt, and R.E. Kasdorf visited RFETS to review radiological protection and radiological work practices with a focus on the decommissioning activities in Buildings 707 and 776. The site rep. participated in this review conducted from Tuesday through Thursday.

**Recommendation 2000-2.** DOE-RFFO currently plans to perform detailed (Phase II) assessments of the confinement ventilation and fire protection systems in Building 371. These Phase II assessments are scheduled to start on February 19<sup>th</sup> and run concurrently. DOE-RFFO completed development of the detailed plan for these assessments that include the criteria and review approach documents and team member identification and assignments. Building 371 provided the team with various information on the confinement ventilation and fire protection systems this week to prepare for the assessments. The plan for these assessments has been provided to the staff. (1-C)

Conduct of Operations/Work Control. Late last week, a Building 707 engineer and workers were attempting to resolve the source of unknown voltage in a junction box being prepared for removal in Building 707. The workers disconnected electrical lead wires in the Building 707 utility control room they suspected of being the source of the voltage. Upon disconnecting the leads, there was a loss of control of confinement ventilation system fans used to control glovebox pressure in D and E Modules (the leads were not the source of the unknown voltage). The work instructions included non-intrusive checks to determine the source of the unknown voltage and Building 707 shift management had authorized the checks. The engineer and workers, however, did not seek shift management approval to disconnect the leads and the work instructions did not cover disconnecting leads as part of the work scope. This event revealed work control, conduct of operations, and training deficiencies with operations and engineering personnel. Corrective actions are in progress. The site rep. will continue follow-up of this event. (1-C)

cc: Board Members