

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

March 22, 2002

**TO:** J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** D. F. Owen, RFETS Site Representative  
**SUBJECT:** RFETS Activity Report for the Week Ending March 22, 2002

**Recommendation 94-1/2000-1.** DOE's Implementation Plan for Recommendations 94-1/2000-1 discusses plans for repackaging of wet combustible residues. The Plan states most of the wet combustible residues will not be repackaged to meet the Interim Safe Storage Criteria (ISSC) requirements (i.e., double metal containment boundaries), but also states that "A high priority will be placed on shipping [wet] combustibles to WIPP, especially those that are non-ISSC compliant."

The site rep. inquired with DOE-RFFO on implementation of the above statement on prioritizing shipment of wet combustible residues. DOE-RFFO responded that the implementation has been informal (i.e., DOE-RFFO has not formally directed Kaiser-Hill to place a high priority on shipping wet combustibles). DOE-RFFO management indicated to the site rep. that placing a priority to ship wet combustibles ahead of other residues (where most have been repackaged to meet ISSC) is not needed. The stated basis was the overall high priority being given to ship all residues and the current projection that residue shipments should be completed by mid-2003. DOE-RFFO management intends to inform DOE Headquarters of this position and then follow-up with any necessary proposed change to the DOE 94-1/2000-1 Implementation Plan. (3-A)

**Conduct of Operations/Work Control.** There have been at least 4 events during the past month in the Building 707/Building 776 Project where operations personnel did not follow procedures properly and/or did not appropriately stop the operation and seek resolution of a work control issue/question. These events include: (1) failure to plug a just-cut glovebox penetration as required, merely taping the penetration, and signing-off that plugging was completed; during a follow-on painting operation this tape was removed and contamination was spread; (2) proceeding to disassemble the cover (based on a waste inspector's request) of a hydraulic unit being removed when that disassembly task was not covered by the work instructions; a bolt was cut that was under tension and it flew off the unit; (3) bypassing of three required electrical energy checks while removing (supposedly) de-energized conduit; the work crew cut through energized conduit; (4) a work crew deciding not to use required waterproof clothing during equipment removal that included cutting of a (supposedly drained) machining coolant drain line (see below).

Following site rep. inquiry on the conduct of operations aspects of these events, DOE-RFFO management held discussions with Kaiser-Hill management on conduct of operations issues in the 707/776 Project. Kaiser-Hill management indicated that steps were being taken to increase engineering and line management supervision during operations. DOE-RFFO suggested that Kaiser-Hill consider additional site resources to monitor on-going operations in the project. (1-C)

**Work Planning.** On Thursday, upon cutting a lathe machining coolant drain line coming from a glovebox in Building 707, a pressurized spray reaching about 5 feet and lasting about 20 seconds occurred resulting in personnel skin and room contaminations. Fact-finding continues. (1-C)