

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

January 19, 2001

TO: K. Fortenberry, Technical Director

FROM: D. Grover and M. Sautman, Hanford Site Representatives

SUBJ: Activity Report for the Week Ending January 19, 2001

Spent Nuclear Fuel Project (SNFP): The SNFP declared an unusual occurrence regarding the violation of the TSR administrative control to purge the cask and multi-canister overpack (MCO) head space to less than 1.6 percent oxygen. The shipment of the 2nd multi-canister overpack (MCO) has been delayed while this issue is being resolved. The project plans to incorporate an oxygen analyzer into the K-West basin cask purge and vent system. Oxygen content will be analyzed during each venting operation and after the gas content in the MCO and cask head spaces have equilibrated to verify that it is within the allowable range. In addition, the procedures will be modified to isolate the cask and to monitor the cask pressure during each pressurization and venting operation to verify that the MCO filter is not impeding the gas exchange. (III-A)

Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP): The consequences of the building 2736-ZB Maximum Possible Fire Loss fire in the draft Project W-460 Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) are significantly higher than originally stated in the PFP FHA and Final Safety Analysis Report. A positive Unreviewed Safety Question was declared this week. PFP is developing a Justification for Continued Operations which will propose an inventory limit for the nondestructive assay, repackaging, staging, and outer weld rooms that would reduce the onsite dose, possibly to 95 rem. (I-C)

Contracts: The Office of River Protection signed a contract with CH2M Hill Hanford Group that will last through September 2006. The Site Reps met with the ORP manager as well as Fluor Hanford (FH) and DOE senior managers to discuss the new CHG and FH contracts. The Site Reps will brief the Board on the new requirements and performance incentives later this month.

T Plant: While setting up for plasma arc operations on the canyon deck, a rigger accidentally bumped into and activated the trigger on an energized plasma arc unit. The resulting pre-ignition spark burned through both sets of anti-contamination clothing and left a quarter-sized skin burn. (III-B)

Building 324 and 327: The Site Reps. performed a walkdown of Building 324 with a focus on the continuing B-Cell cleanout. In addition, a walkdown of Building 327 was conducted to observe the facility condition during the minimum safe configuration status. Three HEPA filters recently failed their periodic penetration tests, which has shutdown most operations in Building 327. (III-B)

cc: Board Members