

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

April 20, 2001

TO: K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: D. Grover and M. Sautman, Hanford Site Representatives
SUBJ: Activity Report for the Week Ending April 20, 2001

Spent Nuclear Fuel Project (SNFP): Following a planned maintenance outage, the project conducted a safety stand down in the K-West Basin as part of the response to the DOE Richland letter on conduct of operations deficiencies. The project will describe this and other actions to correct these longstanding problems in their formal response to DOE. The briefings conveyed the SNFP management's expectations regarding conduct of operations, however, similar briefings in the past have failed to yield the desired results unless reinforced with additional measures. The site reps will evaluate whether these actions address not only the conduct of operations problems but also the degradation of the Integrated Safety Management system.

Conduct of operations problems are still occurring in the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility pending the implementation of the corrective actions. This week an operator locked a valve in the deionized water system open rather than closed as required, overfilling a tank and spilling water onto electrically operated process equipment. (III-A)

Tank Farms: Mr. Sautman met with Fran DeLozier, the CH2M Hill Hanford Group President, to discuss Site Rep concerns with work planning, the use of automated hazards analyses, and management's conduct of operations expectations.

The Office of River Protection performed an inspection of the SY Farm P-28 ventilation system. This safety class system is used to remove flammable gases from the dome spaces of the SY Farm tanks. The P-28 system was formerly the backup system, but is now the only operable exhaust system since the primary system failed in March 2001. While the review identified strengths with the cognizant engineer and the conduct of temporary modification and preventive maintenance, several concerns were identified that have Rec. 2000-2 implications. One concern addressed the lack of periodic assessments of structures, systems, and components to verify configuration and detect deterioration of equipment. In addition, several configuration management deficiencies were identified including discrepancies between drawings and the as-found condition, labeling, and an apparently unauthorized modification to a seal pot heat trace. The findings include procuring the fan as safety significant versus safety class, an inadequate safety equipment list, procedure errors, and unapproved operator aids. It appears that this system was neglected since it was originally the backup system. (Coincidentally, the P-28 system shut down unexpectedly Thursday.) The team also identified issues with the hazard analysis and controls for the routine draining of radiologically contaminated condensate. This surveillance conducted by 3 facility representatives and an authorization basis representative is the type of assessment the Site Rep believes ORP needs to perform more often. (I-C)

cc: Board Members