

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 22, 2000

TO: K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: D. Grover and M. Sautman, Hanford Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Activity Report for the Week Ending December 22, 2000

Announcements: The Department of Energy (DOE) awarded Fluor Hanford Inc. a six-year, \$3.8 billion contract extension. Michael Schlender was appointed Richland's Deputy Manager for Site Transition.

Spent Nuclear Fuel Project: The first production multi-canister overpack (MCO) was transferred to the canister storage building on 12/18/00 and placed inside a storage tube the following day. While loading the MCO in the tube, a hoist speed interlock activated several times, temporarily halting operations. The MCO was fully lowered by switching to manual control of the hoist. Engineering is evaluating the cause of the trips with attention focused on the weight of the fully loaded MCO in place of the empty MCO used during operator training and operational readiness review demonstrations. Fuel processing in the K-West basin is continuing with the next MCO shipment expected in mid January. (III-A)

Tank Farms: CH2M Hill Hanford Group began addition of approximately 40,000 gallons of 8 M NaOH to tank AY-101 to bring its hydroxide concentration back into specifications.

Mr. Sautman observed operators replace the SY-Farm Primary Ventilation System high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter. Since being replaced last year, the total differential pressure had risen to nearly the upper limit. Several gallons of liquid were present inside due to condensation and a plugged drain. The prefilter media dripped when removed and the HEPA filter was likely moist. Since this system does not have a preheater or a deentrainer, water accumulation is likely to continue until they start operating a new primary ventilation system later this year. This system was installed a few years ago, but never started. (III-A)

Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP): The bagless transfer system recently encountered problems welding three cans. First, a can failed the finite leak test check was determined to be due to the leak detector and not the can. A weld deviation alarm was received while welding a second can because the weld did not take as long as expected. This deviation appeared to be due to a delay in the weld recorder starting rather than from the welding process. The problem was fixed with help by Savannah River Site personnel. A third can was not able to be welded due to a failed weld tip. PFP personnel consider these to be unrelated events. (III-A)

cc: Board members