

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 14, 2001

TO: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: Matt Forsbacka and Paul Gubanc, Oak Ridge Site Representatives
SUBJ: Activity Report for Week Ending December 14, 2001

Staff member Hunt and Outside Expert Lewis were at Y-12 to observe the BWXT ORR of 9206.

A. DOE Oak Ridge Operations - Environmental Management (DOE-ORO/EM): On Monday, the DOE-Headquarters authorization basis (AB) review team commenced their review of DOE-ORO and Bechtel Jacobs (BJC). The team is expected back after the holidays to complete the review.

1. The Monday morning presentations by ORO and BJC demonstrated the level of internal discord and lack of integration within and between ORO and BJC. In the absence of a clear, unified vision from ORO or BJC as to how to proceed, Mr. Gubanc assisted the review team in developing a priority list for their review efforts based on hazard and mission impact.
2. On Monday, neither BJC nor ORO could deliver what they considered to be the **official** AB list for their nuclear facilities. After the team leader threatened to cancel the review, BJC provided its official list on Tuesday. Additional exhortations were necessary to get ORO's formal endorsement of the list by Wednesday. ORO and BJC still fail to appreciate the relevance and safety importance of definitive AB's.
3. The team has toured five Oak Ridge nuclear facilities, visited Paducah, and conducted numerous interviews and document reviews. The team found no imminent safety issues. However, the team did identify significant variations in the quality and maintenance of facility AB's, largely as a function of the specific managers and subcontractors involved.
4. Independent of this review, the Assistant Secretary for EM has commissioned assessments to be conducted at Portsmouth (this week) and Paducah (early January) which are intended to provide a quick insight as to the nature of safety issues at these sites. (1-C)

B. Y-12 Disassembly: NNSA completed their Readiness Assessment (RA) for the upcoming disassembly campaign this week with 6 pre-start and 7 post-start findings. Notable pre-starts:

1. A rigorous technical rationale for the redesign of an inadequate lifting fixture which dropped its load must be presented to the RA Team Leader before putting the fixture into service, and the RA Team Leader must be present for demonstrations of the fixture's adequacy. We have discussed the importance of verifying the gripping force the fixture applies to its load with numerous BWXT and NNSA personnel.
2. The disposition of Fire Hazards Analysis recommendations essential to meet the AB has not been fully accomplished. This was previously listed as a post-start item by BWXT, however the failure to implement these recommendations could result in operations outside of the safety envelope. Most of these recommendations have been outstanding since 1998. Followup discussions with BWXT revealed that the recently appointed Assembly Operations Manager is taking actions to implement these recommendations or take compensatory measures.

The NNSA RA team recommended startup following closure of the pre-start findings. (2-A)

cc: Board Members