

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 19, 1999

**TO:** G.W. Cunningham, Technical Director  
**FROM:** Paul F. Gubanc and David T. Moyle, Oak Ridge Site Representatives  
**SUBJ:** Activity Report for Week Ending November 19, 1999

A. Criticality Safety Review: Dr. McKamy from DOE-EH lead a team to review criticality safety at Y-12 this week. This was the first in a series of DOE reviews across the complex in response to the Japan criticality accident, and was focused on solution processing. The team found the criticality program to be well documented, well structured and more than adequately staffed, and was generally comfortable with the controls in place. The team suggested the following improvements:

1. Address natural phenomena for less than catastrophic events.
2. Improve operator understanding of the basis, and involvement with the development, of criticality safety controls. (LMES is already implementing small group seminars.)
3. Establish a dedicated criticality safety officer function within operation organizations.
4. Control process descriptions as stand alone documents separate from the safety basis and the criticality safety evaluations. (We're not yet certain how this can be implemented and controlled.)
5. Expand the scope and detail of addressing criticality safety controls in pre-job briefs. (2-A)

B. DOE Management Changes: Due to budgetary reductions, DOE is offering early retirement to the operations office staff. The Assistant Manager for Defense Programs (AMDP) recused himself from Y-12 activities on Monday and is temporarily assigned as a special assistant to the Operations Office Manager before retiring from DOE at the end of December. (Additional departures of key individuals are also expected.) This hole in the Y-12 management structure had a ripple effect resulting in several "acting" managers in the DOE Y-12 organization. On Friday, DOE announced that Corey Cruz, DOE-AL, would become the acting AMDP on November 28 for a period of 120 days with Bill Brumley, DOE-SR, as his deputy. This sequence of shuffling of personnel and temporary infusion of "outsiders" is expected to further distract the local DOE staff. (1-B)

C. Y-12 HF System Corrective Actions: Since the LMES independent assessment of the HF Supply System (HFSS) was issued in August 1999, we have advocated that LMES prepare a comprehensive corrective action plan in response. While some actions have been taken, they are not tightly coordinated and have suffered from the distractions of the last several weeks. The reporting requirements in the Board's November 9 letter appear to have energized LMES to now pull this comprehensive plan together and assign a central coordinator/manager reporting directly to the LMES President. It's not yet clear what DOE's response will be. (2-A)

D. Fire Protection Review at ORNL: An October 5 letter from the Board to DOE identified concern over the staffing of the ORNL fire department. This week, a DOE review team conducted a "Baseline Needs Evaluation" at ORNL which concluded that fire department staffing levels should be increased from the current five to seven per shift. Of particular note to us, over several days ORNL was unable to provide a definitive contractual, regulatory or technical basis for their current staffing posture. As a result, the proposed staffing level is based entirely on a fairly simple analysis by the review team. A draft report of the review is expected by December 1999. (3-A)

cc: Board Members