## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

January 9, 1998

**TO:** G.W. Cunningham, Technical Director

**FROM:** P.F. Gubanc & D.G. Ogg, Hanford Site Representatives

**SUBJ:** Activity Report for Week Ending January 9, 1998

A. Spent Nuclear Fuel Project (SNFP): DynCorp began Multi-Canister Overpack basket fabrication at the site fabrication shop on Jan. 5 when shop workers started metal work on the center posts of the fuel baskets. A detailed schedule for basket fabrication is expected to be available on January 12. On January 7, Mr. Ogg toured the Cold Vacuum Drying facility construction site. Approximately 50% of the structural steel is in place and the construction subcontractor, Grant Construction Co., erected the first three concrete wall panels on January 7.

B. <u>Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP)</u>: On December 31, 1997, PFP's fissile material hold reached the one year mark. In accordance with DOE O 425.1, Section 4.a.(1).(c), PFP (a Category 2 nuclear facility) would be required to successfully complete a full Operational Readiness Review (ORR) prior to restart. On January 5, 1998, DOE-RL issued a memorandum authorizing themselves an exemption to DOE O 425.1 which permits them to continue with their plans to conduct a Readiness Assessment at PFP. The DOE *Directives System Manual*, DOE M 251.1-1, Chapter II, Section 4.b, provides this authority to the Operations Office Manager. We have provided the memo to, and are consulting with, DNFSB-HQ staff on this matter.

C. <u>Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS)</u>: The DOE-RL approved Fluor Daniel Hanford (FDH) ISMS Plan identifies a three-step process for ISMS implementation:

- 1. Contractor Internal Verification (or "Gap Analysis") which identifies for correction any "gaps" between the ISMS Plan expectations and the Site/Facility/Activity manuals of practice.
- 2. Phase 1 Verification which assesses the ISMS documentation.
- 3. Phase 2 Verification which assesses the actual conduct of work.

FDH (at the site-wide level) and K-Basins have completed their gap analyses and have initiated actions to close those gaps. TWRS intends to complete its gap analysis by the end of January. With the support of Jan Preston, we have had several discussions with DOE-RL this week relative to their preparations to conduct the K-Basins Phase 1 verification (scheduled for January 20-30) and what constitutes satisfactory completion of Phase 1. Mr. Gubanc attended the TWRS gap analysis team training on January 7 and we both expect to attend the K-Basin Phase 1 team training on January 12.

D. <u>233-S Decommissioning</u>: On January 7, Mr. Ogg toured the 233-S work site. Bechtel Hanford, Inc. (BHI) continues dismantlement work in the non-process pipe gallery, and has made safe, steady progress. BHI plans to begin dismantlement of the more highly contaminated areas of 233-S in March, following contractor and DOE-RL ORRs. The Board's staff plans to observe the conduct of the DOE-RL ORR.

cc: Board members