

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 6, 1998

**TO:** G.W. Cunningham, Technical Director

**FROM:** P.F. Gubanc & D.G. Ogg, Hanford Site Representatives

**SUBJ:** Activity Report for Week Ending February 6, 1998

Don Wille, Dave Grover, Joe Roarty and Bill Yeniscavich were on site this week to review the spent nuclear fuel project. Dan Ogg was on leave Thursday.

A. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP): Resumption of the DOE-RL Readiness Assessment (RA) for PFP "Phase 1" fissile material handling is now expected for February 17. On January 30, DOE-EM formally requested a PFP restart plan for Pu stabilization operations ("Phase 2"). This plan should address integrating the startup/restart of the vertical calciner, stabilization furnaces, cementation line and Pu Stabilization and Packaging (PuSAP) project. By extension, this plan will need to address funding limitations and their impact on the vertical calciner and PuSAP schedules. Many of the PFP 94-1 commitments are in jeopardy due to budgetary constraints. DOE-RL recently acknowledged this in the local press and is preparing a formal letter to the Board.

B. Spent Nuclear Fuel Project (SNFP): In late January, Duke Engineering & Services, Hanford (DESH) issued its corrective action plan addressing project management weaknesses. Fluor Daniel Hanford (FDH) and DOE-RL are reviewing the plan for acceptability. We have requested the plan and will forward it when received. Also on January 30, FDH issued the Baseline Change Request for the new Multi-canister Overpack (MCO) sealing strategy. Don Wille has a copy for review.

C. Senior Management Meetings: On February 3, we met with the DOE-RL Manager.

- Mr. Wagoner expressed enthusiasm over a recent meeting he had with some of his excepted service staff and the positive and substantial contributions they are making to DOE-RL.
- We stressed the need for DOE-RL to formally inform the Board of 94-1 commitment slippages.
- We advised that coordination amongst FDH, Bechtel Hanford and PNNL of PRF accident site-wide corrective actions (e.g., emergency preparedness) was problematic.

On February 6, we toured the Site Fabrication Shops with Messrs. Hatch and Yates of FDH. The shops were well kept and possess impressive capabilities. We also discussed the following:

- The "stop work" on receipt of material for fabrication of MCO baskets at the Fab Shops.
- A January 1998 FDH self-assessment which identified fundamental weaknesses in FDH's readiness verification processes. (We agree with the report's findings.)
- Concerns with FDH's site-level procedure implementation process. (See report of January 23.)

D. Chemical Vulnerability: On February 6, FDH is expected to issue reports on chemical vulnerability assessments at five "pilot" facilities. Pending review of the results, FDH expects to conduct chemical vulnerability assessments at the remainder of its facilities.

cc: Board members