

**DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD**

July 24, 1998

**TO:** G.W. Cunningham, Technical Director

**FROM:** P.F. Gubanc, Oak Ridge Site Representative

**SUBJ:** Activity Report for Week Ending July 24, 1998

Mr. Krahn along with staff members Covino, Grover and Massie were in Oak Ridge Tuesday and Wednesday to participate in a Uranium-233 storage standard development meeting.

A. Y-12 Lockout/Tagout Violation: On July 14 (day shift), two maintenance mechanics and their supervisor removed a locked and Danger-tagged valve during maintenance at Building 9212. Facility management, who had established the lockout/tagout, was never notified and only discovered the occurrence during a procedure walkdown on July 16. A "management review" with the involved personnel was held on July 16 to determine the facts of the event. Facility management originally classified the event as non-reportable but eventually did issue an occurrence report on July 20.

This occurrence is indicative of the lack of operational control on maintenance described in the Board's letter of June 12. I have met with DOE and LMES management to emphasize the following:

1. This event should be specifically considered in DOE's response to the Board letter.
2. The "management review" did not identify or pursue all of the potential concerns.
3. Corrective actions would appear appropriate for operations as well as the maintenance staff.
4. Expeditious action should be taken to complete and issue the fact-finding report.

I will continue to follow up on this issue next week.

B. U-233 Storage Standard: On July 21 and 22, I attended the U-233 safe storage standard development meeting along with members of the DNFSB staff. My observations include:

1. The development team appeared strongly biased towards justifying existing container and storage configurations. While understandable, the staff reiterated the need for a defensible technical basis and consideration of life-cycle, versus near-term, costs and hazards.
2. A DOE-DP representative expressed his view that it was unrealistic to expect any significant resources would be available for repackaging and especially relocating U-233 storage. The staff suggested that a robust container might afford more flexibility in storage locations.

C. Y-12 Building 9204-2: On July 20, I conducted an extended walkdown of lithium processing in 9204-2 with the DOE Facility Representative (FR) and LMES deputy organization manager.

1. The DOE FR conducted the majority of the tour and displayed detailed knowledge.
2. The LMES manager acknowledged that he had been in his position for approximately one year but had not received formal training on the lithium processes or safety basis controls.
3. LMES engineering personnel joined the tour to explain the impact of spalling ceiling concrete in a couple of rooms. Based on their visual observations, there is no near term structural threat although additional tests are due to be completed within the next few weeks.

cc: Board members