

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 5, 1999

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director

**FROM:** T. Dwyer and H. Waugh, Pantex Site Representatives

**SUBJECT:** Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending November 5, 1999

**DNFSB Activity Summary:** T. Dwyer and H. Waugh were on site all week.

**W62 D&I Program:** The W62 D&I contractor Readiness Assessment (RA) team worked through last weekend and expects to work this weekend, attempting to complete their review in time for the Milestone 3/Standing Management Team meeting. M&H has already requested a 1 day reprieve -- DOE-AL has moved the meeting to Tuesday, November 9<sup>th</sup>, backing the start of the NESS up to Wednesday, November 10<sup>th</sup>. However, it is not clear that M&H can be ready, even with the extra day. Verification of closure of the significant number of contradictory issues and issues acknowledged-to-be-open in the Management Self Assessment report will be problematic. Given the number of issues observed, it is questionable as to whether the RA should have been started in the 1<sup>st</sup> place. Further, observation of RA demonstrations revealed that despite over a year of reworking, the NEOPs remain marginal at best. The W62 D&I program start-up is also running into conflict with the initiation of changing site-wide control schemes regarding the CSSM-to-TSR conversion, Lightning, and Fire Protection [see below].<sup>[II.A]</sup>

**Fire Protection Issues:** The Flammable Solvents Justification for Continued Operation (PX-JCO-99-01 Rev 1), which was generated after the W78 alcohol fire, was scheduled to expire on October 31<sup>st</sup>. [Recall that this JCO had originally been scheduled to expire on June 30<sup>th</sup>. M&H submitted a revision that AAO refused to approve, and time pressures forced AAO to extend the existing JCO. October 31<sup>st</sup> was chosen as a likely date by which the flammable solvent controls would be incorporated into implemented sitewide TSRs.] Neither implementation of sitewide TSRs nor submission of an acceptable revision to the JCO were completed by the expiration date. Therefore, AAO has extended the expiration date again, to January 31<sup>st</sup>. In the mean time, efforts to develop the W62 safety basis have resulted in generation of a Potential Inadequacy in the Safety Analysis (PISA) for all weapons programs [see Occurrence Report ALO-AO-MHSM-PANTEX-1999-0074]. As a result of empirical tests, M&H has determined that the floor mats used in a number of bays and cells will burn; initiation of burning can take as little as a fire consuming 2 alcohol-wetted kimwipes. Up to this point, these floor mats had been considered noncombustible.<sup>[II.A]</sup>

**W56 Dismantlement Program:** M&H and AAO are currently conducting a preliminary review of a proposal to delete Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.1.1 from the W56 ABCD. This is the LCO that requires verification and documentation of weapon configuration via x-ray prior to removal from the shipping container. The crux of the proposal involves verification of weapon configuration via documentation that certain previous operations were completed satisfactorily. The Site Representatives will watch this development closely. In the mean time, W56 operations were interrupted this week while using a newly modified tool when M&H suddenly realized that this particular tool was called out in the control scheme laid out in the ABCD, but DOE approval for the change had not been obtained..<sup>[II.A]</sup>

**Lightning Issues:** M&H has submitted the final version of the Lightning JCO. Based on initial reviews by AAO and DOE-AL, AAO expects to approve the JCO early next week.<sup>[II.A]</sup>