

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

July 31, 1998

TO: G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director

FROM: M. T. Sautman, R. F. Warther

SUBJECT: RFETS Activity Report for Week Ending July 31, 1998

Recommendation 95-2/94-3. K-H completed their Implementation Validation Review (IVR) of the B371/374 Basis for Interim Operation (BIO). The 5 issues that require action before the BIO can be implemented deal with B374 combustible controls, training on inventory and combustible controls, configuration control of authorization basis documents, the work instruction review process, and weak understanding of the BIO by the Shift Managers (SM). SM level of knowledge has been a finding with several other readiness reviews in B371 recently. As a compensatory action, all work must also be approved by a Shift Technical Advisor, who have a better understanding. The IVR also identified 1 other issue and 6 weaknesses. RFFO approved a Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) which addresses the impact of several BIO Technical Safety Requirement non-compliance conditions related to seismic upgrades, storage of combustibles, fire barrier deficiencies, and inoperable ventilation equipment. The JCO will expire December 4. As of late Friday afternoon, B371 was on track to meet the August 1 BIO Implementation milestone, but will miss the priority upgrade one. SSOC expects to complete the ventilation system upgrade for providing HEPA filters on the supply air inlet next week.

Building 707 Material at Risk (MAR). B707 remained shutdown this week because of problems with the MAR tracking program. (See last 3 weekly reports). An ongoing historical review determined that the risk posed by the MAR in both B707 and B707A never exceeded that analyzed in the JCO. In addition, B707 has not exceeded its 70 kg limit since June 29 (the highest reached was 69.8 kg). K-H will conduct a Readiness Assessment next week that will focus on SSOC's ability to demonstrate that they can manage B707 activities in compliance with their authorization basis nuclear material inventory controls. Other corrective actions include a quality assurance validation of the MAR computer program, performing a 100% inventory, establishing a MAR Administrator, and performing more frequent comparisons with the Safeguards Accountability Network.

Fire Protection. As a result of the INEEL accident, all gaseous fire suppression systems (CO₂, Halon, N₂, etc.) at RFETS were examined. There are 2 active CO₂ systems: one for the emergency generator in B371 and one for the Advanced Size Reduction Facility in B776. The steel enclosure for the generator has been locked and tagged out. There are six other CO₂ systems that have been removed or are out of service. These have been walked down to verify their removal, isolation, or current configuration. One out-of-service system in B865, previously used for a hydraulic press, still has a tank with 5.6 tons of CO₂. The main tank valve has been closed and locked by the Fire Department.

Recommendation 94-1. Since shipment of residues to WIPP will likely be delayed, the Site Reps have initiated a review of RFETS' compliance with the Interim Safe Storage Criteria (ISSC). Based on current information, it appears that the combustibles that are being repacked in B371 do not satisfy the ISSC's two contamination barrier criterion.

cc: Board members