

# DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

**TO:** G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director  
**FROM:** P.F. Gubanc & D.G. Ogg, Hanford Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Activity Report for Week Ending June 20, 1997

Mr. Ogg was on leave Monday. Assistant Secretary Alm was on-site Wednesday thru Friday.

A. Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) Explosion Recovery: On June 18th, Fluor Daniel Hanford (FDH) formally responded to the DOE-RL request that FDH take action to remediate deficiencies in management's attention-to-detail and conduct of operations at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). A new manager from Babcock and Wilcox Hanford Co. (BWHC) was assigned to lead the PRF recovery effort. He will be assisted by the FDH project manager for PFP and a DOE-RL representative. The effectiveness of this action is yet unknown although it appears to further fragment the PFP management team, complicating command and control.

B. Canister Storage Building (CSB) Construction: On June 17th, Mr. Ogg toured the CSB construction site with the DOE-RL CSB construction manager. The constructor, Mowat, appears to have corrected most of the deficiencies that led to the worker injury in May. However, some minor deficiencies were noted during the tour. On June 20th, Mowat raised the first piece of wall structure for the operating building. DOE-RL expects that concrete placement for the deck of the Hot Condition System Annex will occur early next week.

C. Facility Evaluation Board (FEB): The FEB was created by Westinghouse in Spring 1996 following the Savannah River model. At contract transition, the FEB was mapped over to the FDH Quality Assurance organization. To date, the FEB has completed seven facility assessments and has identified the following common issues:

1. Management Assessment - is not effective at identifying or fixing problems
2. Work Control Processes - are not sufficiently proactive, integrated or rigorous
3. Radiological Controls - poor up-front involvement in radiological work planning
4. Quality Assurance - programs are compliant, implementation is weak
5. Training - materials developed between 1991-1994 have not been updated
6. Essential Drawings - poor condition, compensatory measures not rigorously adhered to
7. Requirements Management - policies and procedures are not updated in a timely manner

Our observations are consistent with the FEB's. The President of FDH is giving high visibility to the FEB and their findings although, as has been demonstrated time and again at Hanford, the effectiveness of corrective actions will be directly related to the follow-up performed and the *accountability exercised* on the responsible parties. Sufficient time has not passed to judge this.

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Board Members