

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

June 12, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director
FROM: J. Kent Fortenberry / Joe Sanders
SUBJECT: SRS Report for Week Ending June 12, 1998

Safety Barrier Violations -In the first incident, while subcontractor technicians were performing radiographic examination of piping in Building 233-H (formerly RTF), an operator crossed the "Restricted Area" barricade (defined in the 'Operating Procedure for Radiographic Devices' as the area in which a person at the barrier would receive less than 2 mRem in any one hour). The operator requested and was escorted by a radiography technician through the Restricted Area while the source was sealed; this would have been allowed by the procedure except that the operator was not wearing a TLD. However, after completing his activity, the operator was unable to find the radiography technician and so recrossed the barrier without being escorted. This occurred during the radiographic examination. A critique was held and the event was classified as an off-normal occurrence. The operator should not have crossed the barrier without proper escort. Furthermore, the radiography technician should not have escorted the individual without verifying the person had proper dosimetry.

In the second occurrence, also classified as an off-normal occurrence, a backhoe driver improperly crossed a barrier. The purpose of the barrier, as defined in the ITP Operational Safety Requirements Administrative Controls, is to prevent vehicles from striking above ground portions of HLW transfer lines when transfers are in progress. Earlier in the day, the barrier had been temporarily removed and the backhoe driver was unaware that it had been reestablished. Contributing factors to both of these incidents were the lack of strict formality in which barriers were erected/removed and the allowances for crossing barriers.

Public Meeting of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for Constructing and Operating a Tritium Extraction Facility at SRS - The site reps attended this public meeting held in North Augusta, SC on June 9, 1998. As a follow-on to the Tritium Supply and Recycling Programmatic EIS, this EIS identifies the preferred alternative for TEF siting adjacent to and just west of Building 233-H. Other options considered include refurbishing Building 232-H (current operating extraction facility) and purchasing and modifying the Allied General Nuclear Services fuel reprocessing plant that was never operated.

Tank Farms Authorization Basis Development and Implementation Delays - WSRC proposed to DOE-SR to delay completion of the Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) and implementation of Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) until February and June, 1999, respectively. This is a delay of over one year. DOE-SR is pushing for implementation of most of the TSRs by the end of FY98 but allowing for later implementation of those controls that will require significant additional analyses or major facility modifications (e.g., double valve isolation for all waste transfers). Furthermore, DOE-SR is suggesting that WSRC bypass the BIO and go directly to a SAR compliant with DOE Order 5480.23. Factors contributing to the delays include resource limitations and higher priority project work (e.g., ITP Interim TSRs and Replacement HLW Evaporator safety analyses).