

## **DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD**

October 9, 1998

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director  
**FROM:** J. Kent Fortenberry / Joe Sanders  
**SUBJECT:** SRS Report for Week Ending October 9, 1998

**Ineffective Continuous Air Monitoring (CAM) Alarm** - During walkdowns to assess preparations for the re-wetting of Tank 8 dry sludge (see 7/17/98 and 8/14/98 weekly reports), the site representatives inquired about the presence of a continuously beeping alarm in the area. The explanation given was that the alarm was from a truck backing up. However, further inquiry revealed that the alarm was coming from a portable CAM. About a dozen people were immediately evacuated from the area and a health physics technician was contacted. Evidently, WSRC modifies permanently installed CAMs to give them a distinctive continuous alarm. This modification is not performed for portable CAMs. As a result of this event, DOE-SR has asked WSRC to evaluate modifying the alarm for all CAMs.

**Independent Review of the Actinide Packaging & Storage Facility (APSF)**: A team led by Paul Rice is conducting a 2-3 week review of the APSF technical baseline and the ability of the project management team to effectively manage the project throughout construction and startup. A heavy focus of the review has been an assessment of the project risks. WSRC is completing a project risk assessment which categorizes risks based on both their likelihood and potential impact on the project. Potential impacts include schedule slip, cost increase, Authorization Basis change, design change, and environmental (i.e., required change to EIS). Nineteen high risk items are currently identified. Some of the more significant items include:

- Truck Bay fire - the concern is that the shipping container may not be able to withstand a fire in the truck bay; this area does not have HEPA filtration.
- Single failure criteria - not all safety class systems meet the single failure requirements of IEEE 379.
- Control system interfacing - the main facility control system, Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging control system, and the IAEA accountability control system must interface.

Several of the high risk items would be more accurately characterized as 'program' risks because they are not currently included in the project baseline although DOE may direct WSRC to incorporate them later. These include new, more stringent Safeguards & Security Threat Guidance and inclusion of expansion tunnels off the structure. The review team should issue its final report later this month well in advance of issuance of the construction contract on 11/16/98.