

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 27, 2009

TO: T. J. Dwyer, Technical Director
FROM: W. Linzau and R. Quirk, Hanford Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending November 27, 2009

Plateau Remediation Contractor: The contractor informed the Richland Operations Office (RL) that they will not be ready to declare the completion of ISMS Phase II by the end of this month. The new best estimate for declaring completion is mid- to late-January 2010. This follows a contractor's corporate in-process review of their readiness for the DOE Phase II verification. The review team suggested areas that require additional attention, including: improving the relationship between the central Safety, Health, Security and Quality (SHS&Q) organization and SHS&Q personnel assigned to the individual projects, ensuring the job hazard analysis and automated job hazard analysis processes are aligned, and implementing an improved process for developing and maintaining the Craft Hazard Analysis. RL is planning to complete the DOE verification of ISMS Phase II in February or March 2010.

Tank Farms: The contractor completed the transfer from double-shell tank (DST) AN-101 to AP-105. Significant oversight was provided by Office of River Protection (ORP) facility representatives and senior management as well as contractor management. Their primary focus points were satisfactory performance of the condition of approval and compensatory actions identified in the Safety Evaluation Reports for two Justifications for Continued Operation as well as general conduct of operations. Formality in the control area, including three-way communications, has improved.

The Board sent a letter to DOE on September 17, 2008, noting a significant number of design deficiencies in the electrical distribution system for the DST farms. The contractor reported this week that they had completed the necessary modifications.

River Corridor Closure Project: The contractor has almost completed collecting the contaminated grout from the sump of B-cell in Building 324. The sump was grouted years ago to stabilize the residual contamination, and the project estimates removing the grout will reduce the material-at-risk (MAR) in the hotcell from an estimated 40,000 curies to 8,000 curies. The work is being accomplished with remotely operated tools mounted on a skid placed inside the cell. The sump is lined with stainless steel, but the project discovered after the grout was removed that the liner was badly corroded and has a hole roughly four inches in diameter. The contractor anticipates the concrete under the corroded area and the soil below the concrete will need additional D&D planning to account for the high probability of significant contamination from the breach. The site rep questioned the contractor on the arrangements to store the containers used to collect the contaminated grout prior to shipment to the Central Waste Complex. The contractor committed to respond with their plans to provide safe storage of these remote-handled containers. The collection of the grout should be completed next week and then the contractor will perform a dose profile to estimate the remaining MAR.

Office of River Protection : ORP announced that V. Callahan is the acting Nuclear Safety Director. J. Dowell will be acting as the Deputy Manager while maintaining his current position of Assistant Manager of Engineering and Nuclear Safety.