

## **DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD**

August 29, 1997

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director  
**FROM:** J. Kent Fortenberry / Joe Sanders  
**SUBJECT:** SRS Report for Week Ending August 29, 1997

**FB-Line Bagless Transfer System** - DOE-SR authorized FB-Line Bagless Transfer System operations this week following correction of pre-start findings from the readiness assessment. The Bagless Transfer System will seal-weld plutonium buttons into 304-L SS inner containers. When the Actinide Packaging & Storage Facility (APSF) is operational, two of these inner containers (i.e., two buttons) will be seal-welded into a single outer (PuSAP) container to achieve the DOE-STD-3013 long-term storage configuration.

**FY99 EM Budget Work-Out Meeting** - As reported earlier (5/23/97 Weekly Report) the SRS component of EM's 10-year Accelerated Clean-up Plan relies on productivity enhancements to accomplish a whopping 36% (\$4.3 billion) of the work identified. For FY99, SRS identified \$115 million in productivity improvements and cost efficiencies, committed to find \$50 million more in as yet un-identified similar enhancements, and committed to a \$30 million inflation absorption. However, the SRS FY99 target budget remained \$53 million short. The purpose of the work-out meeting this week between EM-1 and SRS was to identify additional efficiencies to make up this \$53 million shortfall for FY99. SRS argued that scope reductions were needed since further efficiencies were not likely and, for the given scope of activities, the level of funding might begin to affect their ability to operate safely. The final agreement, while concluding that additional efficiencies would be challenging, committed to pursue a combination of additional efficiency improvements and scope reductions to meet the FY99 target budget.

**Tritium Facilities Authorization Agreement** - DOE-SR approved a second authorization agreement this week. The 'Defense Programs Authorization Agreement' authorizes (continued) operation of the tritium facilities, which includes Building 233-H (formerly RTF) and Buildings 232/234/236/237/238-H (the existing tritium facilities). There is some debate onsite whether all hazard category (HC) 2 facilities should receive an authorization agreement, verses only those priority facilities agreed upon with the Board. The excluded facilities would include 773-A (SRTC hot cells), 235-F (plutonium storage vaults), Moderator Storage Facility, Central Labs, and Solid Waste Management Facilities.

**Revised Steam Tube Rupture Accident Analyses for the HLW Evaporators** - WSRC has drafted revised analyses for evaporator breach accidents previously calculated to exceed onsite and offsite evaluation guidelines (7/3/97 Weekly Report). The revised analyses includes isolating steam within 30 seconds (verses 2 minutes), using a more recent dispersion code which incorporates plate out/deposition of particulate, and crediting deposition/condensation within the evaporator cell. These factors reduce the calculated offsite dose by two orders of magnitude.