

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 6, 2009

**TO:** T. J. Dwyer, Technical Director  
**FROM:** D. L. Burnfield and M. T. Sautman, Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending November 6, 2009

**DNFSB Staff Activity:** Messrs. Galaska, Gutowski, and Heshmatpour conducted a review of the contractor and DOE Fire Protection Programs, the SRS Fire Department, and fire protection controls for K Area and Tank 48 projects.

**F-Area:** The Site Rep attended a walkdown by the team planning the 293-F stack height reduction. This stack formerly served 235-F. The stack is being shortened to preclude a potential accident scenario where a seismic event causes it to topple and strike ventilation ducting on 235-F. Prior to SRNS beginning this work, they will need to remove several obstructions, disconnect the stack from the sand filter, and clean out the base of the stack.

**F/H Laboratory:** The Site Rep attended a post-job review for an activity where instrumentation cables were removed without the work being properly planned or authorized. The SRNS supervisor had authorized the removal of instrumentation, but had not authorized the removal of the cable which was not routinely monitored by radiological protection personnel. The work was being performed using the wrong radiological work permit (RWP) without Radiological Control Organization coverage, which should have been present. It was determined that facility guidance could have been made clearer and that the communications could have been improved. In addition, the Site Rep noted that the RWPs could have been improved by more explicitly defining the approved tasks.

**E-Area:** Since July, the Solid Waste Management Facility has dropped three waste boxes. The latest drop of a B-25 Box happened when a worker inadvertently operated the wrong lever on a fork lift and tilted the box in lieu of lowering it as he intended. The Site Rep attended the fact finding in E-area. SRNS appears to be taking the necessary actions to attempt to preclude similar events in the future.

**Saltstone:** While starting the facility on 10/31, Saltstone had a process upset. The Site Rep discussed the corrective actions with facility management and surveyed a spare grout hopper staged for possible replacement. The piping was later disconnected from the grout hopper, the hopper was inspected and Facility Management determined it prudent to replace the hopper. When SRR attempted to remove the hopper it was stuck and could not be removed. Corrective actions are underway to replace the hopper. Concurrently SRR assembled four teams to review pump performance, process data, process flowsheet/grout formulation, and perform equipment inspections. An independent review panel, consisting of senior contractor technical personnel, is also meeting to assist in determining the necessary corrective actions. DOE has also enhanced their oversight.

**Nuclear Safety:** The Site Rep attended a Safety Basis Steering Committee meeting. In an effort to improve the processes related to nuclear safety, several actions are being taken by SRNS. For example, the site directives related to nuclear safety are being rewritten in a more organized manner to improve consistency to a system that has evolved with changing regulation and guidance over many years. The Site Rep noted that the schedule for completing the directives review was very aggressive (to be completed before mid calendar year 2010) and that it would be difficult to complete these revisions in a diligent manner while maintaining this schedule. The Site Rep will closely monitor the changes to the sites nuclear safety directives.