

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

January 14, 2011

TO: T. J. Dwyer, Technical Director
FROM: M. T. Sautman and D. L. Burnfield, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending January 14, 2011

Safety Equipment: SRNS facilities continue to experience a number of safety equipment reliability issues. HB-Line dissolver operations were curtailed again after a failed part and excessive vibration caused two of the four safety-class H-Canyon exhaust fans to become inoperable. SRNS also declared HB-Line's safety-significant backup power diesel generator out-of-service due to high water and sediment content in the generator's fuel tank. Meanwhile, 235-F has been in Limiting Condition for Operations (LCO) since 2010 due to problems with its exhaust fans and K-Area is in two LCOs due to an inoperable backup battery for a fire alarm panel. (See November 19, 2011 report).

F-Tank Farms: SRR inserted the crawler and sample bucket inside Tank 5 and was able to obtain the initial samples. Later, the crawler became stuck on a previously cut cooling coil before it could be removed from the tank. SRR is pursuing alternative methods to remove the crawler that may be attempted next week.

URS Work Management Workshop: Representatives from URS contractors across the complex met to discuss a corporate-wide guidance document for planning and controlling work. Rick Verhaagen and the site rep attended this workshop as well as representatives from Environmental Management (EM) and the Energy Facility Contractors Group. URS used EM guidance and NNSA requirements as the basis for creating the document. They created a strawman that will be used to obtain further comments from the sites in preparation for a second workshop to be conducted in a few months.

Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction Unit: Engineers are investigating the cause(s) of higher than normal Isopar® L concentrations in several batches of strip effluent.

Specific Administrative Controls (SAC): In light of Board and DOE comments, SRR reworded a draft SAC so that a transfer of high Isopar® L strip effluent in excess of the permitted transfer volume would constitute a SAC violation. (See December 17 and 24, 2010 and January 7, 2011 reports).

Saltstone: The Operational Readiness Review team conducted follow-up interviews to validate the effectiveness of training conducted to address their findings. Operations and engineering staff demonstrated improved knowledge of Technical Safety Requirement fundamentals without having the use of reference materials. (See December 17, 2010 report).

Facility Representative Oral Board: DOE-SR started identifying critical elements for their oral board questions that must be addressed in order for the candidate to pass, regardless of their performance in the rest of the board. The site rep continues to observe a high standard in the conduct of DOE-SR facility representative oral boards.