

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

TO: Timothy Dwyer, Technical Director
FROM: Wayne Andrews and David Kupferer, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Oak Ridge Activity Report for Week Ending August 20, 2010

W. Andrews and C. Roscetti attended the DOE Readiness Workshop in Alcoa on Tuesday and Wednesday. D. Kupferer was out of the office Monday through Thursday.

Operational Performance Improvement. As part of its Operational Performance Improvement (OPI) training sessions conducted three times a year, B&W has briefed most production personnel on the lessons learned from the recent violations of a procedural requirement to keep combustibles under protective cover during spark producing operations (see the 7/9/10 site rep. report). Specifically, OPI personnel emphasized the need for proper disciplined operations including strict procedural adherence.

Readiness Workshop. This week, Y-12 hosted the 10th Annual Readiness Workshop. The workshop included several discussions regarding the readiness process B&W used in preparation for authorizing operations in the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (see the 1/29/10 site rep. report) including the following topics: performance criteria development, readiness assist teams, the Readiness Certification Assurance Board (see the 6/5/09 site rep. report), and initial operations. The workshop also included discussion regarding the following: implementation of DOE Order 425.1D (*Verification of Readiness to Start Up or Restart Nuclear Facilities*) and DOE Standard 3006-2010 (*Planning and Conducting Readiness Reviews*), determining the type of readiness review to perform and who should be the start-up authority, the in-advance test program for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MOX), developing a Quality Assurance organization to support nuclear projects, and the status of several major DOE projects (e.g., MOX, Waste Treatment Plant, Uranium Processing Facility, Salt Waste Processing Facility, and Chemical and Metallurgical Research Replacement).

Special Nuclear Material Vehicle/Justifications for Continued Operations. In June 2008, YSO approved a Justification for Continued Operations (JCO) that included administrative controls to restrict on-site transportation of certain weapon components (see the 6/6/08 site rep. report). In March of this year, B&W submitted the annual update for the Special Nuclear Material Vehicle (SNMV) Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and associated Technical Safety Requirements. This annual update incorporated the administrative controls from the JCO. YSO approved the annual update in May. Last week, B&W completed its Implementation Validation Review (IVR) of the subject controls. The IVR team identified one finding during its review. Specifically, the review team determined that B&W had not adequately evaluated the full range of containers types and associated material quantities that can be on the SNMV at any one time (i.e., B&W failed to demonstrate that the Maximum Anticipated Quantities of materials, which provide the basis for the subject administrative controls, were bounding). B&W resolved this finding during the review by performing the necessary calculations. Subsequent to completion of the IVR, B&W made the annual update effective and canceled the subject JCO. There are no longer any active JCOs at Y-12. In other words, all of the controls previously captured in JCOs have been incorporated into the applicable safety basis documents and implementing procedures (see the 5/28/10 and 9/4/09 site rep. reports).