

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

May 21, 2010

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Timothy Dwyer, Technical Director  
**FROM:** Jonathan Plaue, DNFSB Site Representative  
**SUBJECT:** LLNL Activity Report for Week Ending May 21, 2010

The Site Representative was out of the office on Thursday and Friday.

**Safety Basis:** The Laboratory was praised in an April 2010 report by the Office of Health, Safety and Security entitled *Specific Administrative Controls at DOE Nuclear Facilities*. The report noted the effectiveness of the Laboratory's process for developing and implementing Specific Administrative Controls (SACs) based on a sampling of SACs reviewed during the fall 2009 visit.

**Training:** On May 12, 2010, the Livermore Site Office (LSO) transmitted comments to the Laboratory regarding the draft Training Implementation Matrix (TIM) for the Hardened Engineering Test Building. Several of the comments focused on the need to implement a systematic approach to training, such as deriving learning objectives from a job task analysis. This issue was identified in an April 2009 assessment of training performed by LSO and is being addressed through a Nuclear Facilities Training Improvement Plan. Another area of comments focused on the training and qualification arrangements for personnel from outside of the Nuclear Materials Technology Program (e.g, Maintenance Utilities and Services Department, Emergency Management Department, subcontractors, and outside vendors). LSO has made similar comments on the TIMs for the Radiography Facility and the Plutonium Facility. Resolution of the comments and submission of revised TIMs for all of the mentioned facilities is expected by August 30, 2010.

**Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management:** On April 30, 2010, the Laboratory submitted documentation in support of the conversion of the Building 695 Segment into two radiological facilities (see weekly report dated April 9, 2010). LSO is currently reviewing the documents to ensure hazard categorization was performed in accordance with Department of Energy Standard 1027 and that the procedures governing radiological material inventory tracking are adequate to ensure each facility does not exceed the hazard category 3 threshold. LSO is also examining the Tier II safety basis documents to ensure LSO comments previously provided on the hazards analysis were appropriately incorporated.

**Hardened Engineering Test Building:** On May 19, 2010, the Laboratory issued a Potential Inadequacy of the Safety Analysis (PISA) regarding a discrepant as found condition for the facility ventilation system. The ventilation system is identified as Equipment Important to Safety and was found intermittently not to maintain the negative pressure regime described in the safety basis. This issue was first observed in December 2009 and the system has since been corrected (see weekly report dated April 23, 2010). The PISA notes that a recent review of the issue indicated that a PISA should have been declared when the issue was first discovered.