

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 27, 2013

**MEMO To:** Steven Stokes, Acting Technical Director  
**FROM:** Thomas Spatz, Pantex Site Representative  
**SUBJECT:** Pantex Plant Report for Week Ending September 27, 2013

**Elimination of Specific Administrative Controls:** Last week, the NNSA Production Office (NPO) approved an authorization basis change package that eliminated the *Convoy Right-of-Way*, *Pantex Speed Limit*, and *Convoy Speed Limit* Specific Administrative Controls (SACs). Babcock & Wilcox Pantex (B&W) replaced the SACs with a Vehicle Safety Program. B&W implements the Vehicle Safety Program with a reference-use work instruction titled, *Complying with the Traffic Safety Program*. In May 2013, NPO approved an authorization basis change package that revised the accident scenario for vehicle insults to facilities. (See report for 5/31/2013.) In the SER transmittal letter, NPO recommended B&W develop the Vehicle Safety Program rather than continuing the practice of using SACs to establish the requirements for the safe operation of motor vehicles. NPO stated that the Vehicle Safety Program should capture the aspects of normal motor vehicle operation on the plant that are relevant to the evaluation of vehicle hazards in the DSA.

B&W first attempted to remove these SACs in December 2012. (See report for 12/28/2012.) The Site Representative raised questions regarding the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) requirement that the transport trailer be sufficiently robust to withstand a collision up to 30 mph. B&W took no further action on that change proposal. The Site Representative has asked NPO how this requirement is protected in the Vehicle Safety Program and how the credited features of the program, as implemented in a reference-use work instruction, will be protected over time.

**Emergency Management Department Drill Program Finding:** NPO sent a letter to B&W directing them to submit a corrective action plan within thirty working days for a finding related to the emergency management drill program. NPO identified that B&W had not conducted any “hands on” drills with the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) since the July 2012 annual exercise; not meeting the requirement for annual demonstration of proficiency by all personnel comprising the ERO. NPO remarked that the ERO members are not maintaining their proficiency skills, resulting in doubt that Pantex would be able to protect the health and safety of the workers and public during an emergency. This week, NPO sent another letter to B&W regarding the late submittal of the Emergency Management Exercise Package for 2013 (EMEX 13-1). NPO stated that the program has significantly degraded over time and its performance is unsatisfactory.

**High Pressure Fire Loop (HPFL) Planned Maintenance Event:** This week, B&W held an event critique for an event that followed planned maintenance to the HPFL. B&W had performed annual maintenance to verify the diesel pump over-speed kill switch, which involved manual adjustment of the pressure regulating valve. Following this maintenance, B&W was performing a flow test when the technicians discovered water flowing from the pump building. They shut down the pump and entered the appropriate Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO). B&W discovered that the diesel motor rpm had been set too high at the conclusion of the maintenance to verify the kill switch. B&W plans to change the procedure to record the diesel motor rpm setting at the end of the maintenance operation.