

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

TO: Steven Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: William Linzau and Rory Rauch, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Oak Ridge Activity Report for Week Ending May 2, 2014

Oxide Conversion Facility: Activities to place the hydrogen fluoride (HF) cylinder with a suspected leaking valve in a Department of Transportation (DOT)-certified configuration (see 4/18/14 report) have been delayed because the vendor does not have an overpack container qualified to support HF transportation. The vendor plans to subcontract services for another vendor to supply a DOT-certified overpack container. Once the specific attributes of this overpack container are available, B&W engineering personnel plan to develop a safety basis supplement for the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for the 9212 Complex that addresses the risk of removing the HF cylinder from its storage enclosure without DOT certification (the safety basis currently credits the DOT-certified HF cylinder to decrease the frequency of a loss of confinement of HF). B&W is planning to have the vendor and its subcontractor at Y-12 on May 15 and 16 to install the overpack container and transport the HF cylinder off site.

Building 9212: Maintenance personnel are nearing completion of repair activities on the Holden Gas Furnace (see 12/6/13 report). Piping modifications and the replacement of the brick heating surfaces on the furnace interior have both been completed. These modifications and the application of *NFPA 86: Standard for Ovens and Furnaces* resulted in the need to update the 9212 SAR. B&W's readiness organization started an implementation validation review (IVR) to ensure the changes to the SAR were adequately implemented prior to the introduction of natural gas during the upcoming furnace tuning activity. Last week, Production management paused the review to address issues raised by the IVR team. The team questioned the workability of the tuning procedure and the adequacy of the documentation that verified compliance with the applicable NFPA 86 requirements. The IVR should restart next week after these issues are addressed.

Conduct of Operations/Building 9204-2E: Late last week, NPO facility representatives identified an issue with a round sheet for a glovebox in Building 9204-2E. Specifically, an operator had recorded a reading from an oxygen monitor without noting that the monitor's calibration was not current. The subject round sheet contained a task for the operator to verify that all equipment calibrations are current. The operator completed this task by verifying that the monthly calibration checklist had been completed rather than reviewing the specific calibration dates for each piece of equipment, as intended by management. No operations were performed in the glovebox zone supported by this oxygen monitor after its calibration lapsed. This week, the Assembly/Quality Evaluation Production (A/QEP) Manager directed all A/QEP supervisors to observe any operator rounds performed for the equipment under their purview to ensure that round sheet tasks are being performed in accordance with management's expectations.

Aging Infrastructure: B&W has completed a transitional fire hazard analysis (TFHA) for Building 9201-5 that recommends that the majority of the water-based fire suppression systems be isolated and placed out-of-service. The NPO Authority Having Jurisdiction has approved the TFHA and notes that the fire risk has been reduced to a point where all but two of the fire suppression systems can be placed out-of-service. Most transient combustibles were removed from the facility during the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act project. This week, the site rep walked down sections of the facility and confirmed that the observed areas were still free of transient combustibles. This TFHA supports B&W's efforts to limit personnel entry due to the degraded condition of the building (see 4/25/14 report) by reducing the number of systems that require periodic maintenance, inspection, and testing.