

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

October 3, 2014

TO: S. A. Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: M. T. Sautman and D. L. Burnfield, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending October 3, 2014

Saltstone: A camera inspection of the failed grout pump hose did not find any foreign material, but gouges and striations were visible inside the hose. SRR resumed grouting operations on Monday. (See 9/26/14 weekly report). The site reps also visited the Saltstone Disposal Unit 6. Recent construction work is focusing on erecting the interior columns and placing the walls.

Savannah River National Laboratory: An installer correctly positioned valves and tagged them out per the order. A shift operations manager (acting as the verifier) verified the correct valve positions, signed the paperwork, and installed the locks. However, he later removed a lock from a plant air valve to see if it could be used elsewhere and when he returned the lock, he accidentally installed the lock on an incorrect valve, which was right next to the correct one. The mistake was only identified after the job was complete and workers were removing the lock and tags.

Recommendation 2012-1, Savannah River Site Building 235-F Safety: Commitment 2c-3 of the implementation plan states that DOE will complete the installation and acceptance testing of the Fire Detection and Alarm System (FDAS) for the Plutonium Fuel Form facility and document that completion in a letter to the Board by 12/20/13. Because of several delays outside the control of DOE-SR or the contractor, the expected date for the delivery of that letter is being postponed until the end of 2014. Post-installation testing of the FDAS revealed several minor problems that could postpone that date unless the solutions are managed efficiently. These include: 1) the need to ensure that batteries meet specified voltages, 2) ensuring either that the alarms can be heard or that a strobe is placed in each room to warn the workers, and 3) the elimination or compensation of induced voltages. SRNS found two cases where induced voltages exceed the allowed 1.0 volt. In one case, SRNS can resolve the problem by moving the module. In the other case, SRNS is reviewing several possible solutions with the cable vendor to determine the best way of dealing with seven temperature-sensing cables that exceed the voltage limit.

Defense Waste Processing Facility: Last week, the staff discussed SRR's preliminary results of their thermal, structural, radiological, and other analyses examining the double stacking of canisters inside the original Glass Waste Storage Building. This week, SRR submitted their Technical Feasibility Report that validated that they could recover 300 storage positions. One of the risks identified by SRR is the uncertainty in the vault height as built because there is little space between the top of the upper canister and bottom of the new shield plug, when allowable tolerances are taken into account. (See 2/14/14 weekly report).

Readiness Reviews: DOE is developing a checklist for graded approach readiness assessment that would be used for the Plan of Action, Implementation, and the final report. The site rep reviewed the draft checklist and provided minor comments.