

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 28, 2014

**TO:** S. A. Stokes, Technical Director  
**FROM:** P. Fox, D. Gutowski and R. Quirk, Hanford Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending November 28, 2014

**Tank Farms.** In response to recurring conduct of operations problems in the tank farms, the contractor continued performing oral boards for Operations Engineers (OE) (see Activity Report 11/21/2014). The contractor is using the boards to identify and understand common areas of weakness in OE operational knowledge and leadership skills. The contractor intends to use this information to improve the focus of OE training with the overall goal of improving performance in conduct of operations. So far, more than one third of the OEs have failed these supplemental boards and will require additional training to regain qualification.

ORP's Senior Review Board approved a safety basis amendment that primarily addresses Safety Instrumented Alarms (see Activity Report 8/22/2014).

The contractor now requires supplied-air respirators to be used in tent enclosures over double-shell tank farm valve pits after adding them to the list of low-threshold vapor areas (see Activity Reports 11/7/2014, 5/9/2014).

**Waste Treatment Plant (WTP).** The ORP ashfall hazard working group (see Activity Report 9/19/2014) completed their deliberations. The team identified alternative approaches for addressing the volcanic ashfall hazard at the WTP and each alternative was evaluated against criteria established by the team. The identified criteria focused on achieving effective control of a conservatively estimated hazard while minimizing overall impact to the ongoing facility design. Using this process, the team reduced the initial pool of alternatives to five options that will be further developed before a final control selection is identified. The options may be used individually or in combination with each other to provide the necessary controls. Two of the options selected by the team focus on achieving a more refined but still conservative estimate of the hazard, two of the options consider operational strategies to reduce or eliminate the hazard, and the last approach focuses on facility design changes that may be necessary to address the hazard. The team also identified design and construction work that should remain suspended pending a final control selection. The team expects to deliver their report to DOE headquarters in mid-December.

**Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP).** The contractor disconnected the last permanent glovebox in the main PFP processing facility from the glovebox ventilation exhaust system (E4). The E4 system is still used for two other PFP facilities as well as for temporary glovebags used for decontaminating and size reducing equipment in the primary facility.