

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

TO: Steven Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: William Linzau and Rory Rauch, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Oak Ridge Activity Report for Week Ending June 12, 2015

Transuranic (TRU) Waste Processing Center: Last week, the site reps and a member of the DNFSB headquarters staff observed WAI and UCOR Operations personnel demonstrate a new operation to load canisters of remote handled (RH) waste into an overpack configuration and transfer these overpacks from WAI staging areas to a UCOR storage facility. Due to the suspension of shipments of TRU waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), WAI arranged to store TRU waste at UCOR storage facilities. The new WAI-designed overpack will be used to protect the RH waste canisters during on-site transport and the canisters will remain in an overpack configuration during storage. The site reps provided OREM and WAI staff with several procedure improvement opportunities for consideration. These included opportunities to add a warning to communicate a radiological exposure hazard during overpack loading, eliminate generic information in the precautions and limitations section, and reconcile inconsistencies in the site-specific requirements for procedure suspension protocols and the execution of Use-Every-Time procedures. The site reps also provided an opportunity to improve communications between WAI and UCOR prior to starting overpack transfer operations by suggesting the contractors develop some means of sharing changes in facility, radiological, or environmental conditions prior to the operation (prior to the demonstration, each organization's work crew held an independent pre-job briefing). The demonstration was in support of an ongoing Implementation Verification Review (IVR) for Revision 31 to the TWPC Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) and will also support a readiness assessment that will start after the IVR is completed.

In addition, the site reps watched the IVR team as they observed a demonstration of several new specific administrative control (SAC) surveillances. One of the demonstrated surveillances was to ensure two cargo containers credited as safety-significant barriers to protect a waste storage area are empty. The IVR team noted that the operator inspected the interior of the wrong containers during the demonstration. Upon completion of the IVR late last week, the Team Leader reported nine findings that require correction prior to declaring implementation complete and two findings that can be completed after the revised DSA/TSRs are implemented.

Lastly, the site reps observed WAI Operations personnel conduct a manned entry into the hot cell in the Main Process Building. This evolution was being conducted as part of an outage to support preventive maintenance of the equipment in the hot cell. The observed evolution involved initial entry to apply fixative to the interior surfaces to control contamination. The site rep discussed conditions in the hot cell with WAI's Radiological Control Manager, who indicated that radiation levels in the hot cell were much lower than previous entries due to reduced hold-up of high radiation debris. No issues were noted during the observed activities.

Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF)/Conduct of Operations: Last week, an NPO employee identified a discrepant condition when he discovered an active tag from a CNS lockout/tagout (LO/TO) permit sitting unattached next to a piece of equipment. The LO/TO permit was for work to remove an electrical cabinet. During the fact finding the electrician reported that the tag may have fallen off the breaker as the cabinet was being removed but he failed to notify his supervisor of the discrepant condition. Additionally, the implementing LO/TO permit had not been closed at the time of the discovery of the unattached tag.