

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

June 26, 2015

TO: S. A. Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: D. L. Burnfield, Site Representative
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending June 26, 2015

Board staff member Scott Seprish was onsite to observe the DOE headquarters construction progress peer review of the Salt Waste Processing Facility.

Recommendation 2012-1, Savannah River Site Building 235-F Safety: As reported last week, the DOE readiness assessment (RA) for risk reduction in building 235-F continued. Board staff member John Mercier was on site to watch the completion of the field activities. The E-5 exhaust fan damper controller remains out of service (see 6/19/15 report).

Solid Waste Management Facility (SWMF): Following an incident in 2011, where three drums were found to contain greater than expected quantities of plutonium-239 in the presence of liquids, SRNS completed a nuclear criticality safety evaluation (NCSE). They determined that such drums should be isolated in a culvert. To ensure isolation, the remaining thirteen drums in the culvert were to be empty and additional other controls were developed. As a follow up to this evaluation, the isolation control was included in the facility limiting conditions of operation (LCO) as part of the safety documentation. However, since the control had already been put in place for the initial drums in question, and there were no additional drums meeting the initial conditions, SWMF failed to develop the necessary technical work documents to place a similar drum in the culvert in accordance with the controls contained in the LCO. The facility remains in a safe condition, they are developing the necessary changes to their procedures to ensure that they are able to remedy a similar situation should it occur in the future.

L-Area: While operating in the dry well SRNS personnel heard a loud thud while lifting a cask. They noticed that the shim plate had fallen. When inspecting the dry well for any damage they found that the alignment plate had fallen as well. SRNS personnel retrieved the shim plate and examined it dimensionally with no deformation noted. They will also retrieve the alignment plate from the dry well and compare it to a new alignment plate to determine if any damage may have resulted from the fall.

HB-Line: Following the criticality incident earlier this year (see 5/22/15 report), DOE requested SRNS to conduct a contractor RA before allowing HB-line to resume transfers to H-Canyon. Experienced contractor personnel conducted the review. The site rep performed field observations of the evaluated evolutions and witnessed interviews of several key personnel. Field evolutions are now complete.

H-Canyon: As reported last week, SRNS conducted a contractor RA on the resumption of the second uranium cycle. The assessment is complete and the contractor is using their management review team process to close the prestart actions.