

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 25, 2015

**TO:** S. A. Stokes, Technical Director  
**FROM:** M. T. Sautman and D. L. Burnfield, Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending September 25, 2015

**HB-Line:** Like several facilities, SRNS relied on a specific administrative control for the inventory control program to ensure that the material-at-risk (MAR) stayed below analyzed quantities. A recent SRNS review of inventory paperwork found three cases where the MAR inventory was not updated properly. Although none of the events caused any limits to be exceeded and most were in the conservative direction, the rigor in implementing this key SAC was poor as inaccurate data was in the database for up to 12 days. Furthermore, SRNS also identified a case where a flaw in the database caused the original product can mass data to disappear from the MAR inventory and facility inventory roll up totals during the sample data entry process; this caused the MAR to be underestimated. This database is level A software and the software quality assurance test plan did not uncover this flaw.

**Solid Waste Management Facility (SWMF):** While performing a monthly inspection of the Transuranic (TRU) waste an operator incorrectly identified a surveillance related step as not-applicable (N/A). According to SRNS procedures, only conditional steps (e.g., if-then steps) can be marked as N/A. In this particular case, SRNS recently revised the procedure so that this Verify step was in the middle of several similar conditional steps so it was easier to overlook. SWMF personnel could have written the procedure in a way that was less error prone.

**K-Area:** SRNS declared a Potential Inadequacy in the Safety Analysis after identifying that some 9975 shipping packages contain a polyvinyl chloride (PVC) bag for contamination control within the primary containment vessel (see 8/21/15 report). This was a violation of the safety basis documentation since the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) did not address these materials. This week K-Area personnel approved a negative Unreviewed Safety Question Evaluation (USQE) because the calculations show that the other forms of plastic that might be present will not significantly add to an over pressurization event or to container corrosion. This approval allows the material that is currently stored in the facility to remain in storage and the lifting of the Limiting Conditions for Operations.

**Readiness Reviews:** EM Headquarters issued direction that the periodicity of all EM Startup Notification Reports would be reduced from quarterly to semiannually. While DOE Order 425.1D allows the program secretarial officer to define a periodicity other than quarterly, the staff believes the intent was for this to be the exception where warranted rather than the norm.

**SRNS:** The tritium facilities, SRNL, Site Services, Engineering, and Environmental/Safety and Health organizations transitioned from an operational pause to deliberate operations. The site rep observed a reservoir activity and a contamination drill that were conducted at the tritium facilities. Other nuclear facilities were still conducting small group sessions, developing assessment plans, or waiting for senior management approval.

**Defense Waste Processing Facility:** SRR resumed melter operations. Processing had been shut down since April due to purge system modifications and safety basis issues.