

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

July 1, 2016

**TO:** S. A. Stokes, Technical Director  
**FROM:** P. Fox and D. Gutowski Hanford Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending July 1, 2016

The Board's staff briefed DOE and the associated contractors regarding results from a recent review of Plutonium Finishing Plant demolition planning and readiness activities and an observation of the site emergency planning drill.

**Tank Farms.** The contractor's Plant Review Committee (PRC) met to discuss a proposed safety basis amendment that would add a new Specific Administrative Control (SAC) to protect temperature limits for safety-significant (SS) equipment from in-pit heaters (see Activity Report 12/18/2015). A PRC member noted that a supporting calculation for this SAC did not include one existing pit configuration with a different heat load. The PRC did not approve the amendment and will reconvene once the supporting calculation is updated.

The contractor's Executive Safety Review Board Meeting approved a cause to corrective action review related to the failure of a SS selector switch used to perform temperature monitoring that is required for TSR compliance (see Activity Report 5/11/2016). The review determined that the switch design was less than adequate. All SS switches of this type will be eliminated from the system design and replaced with an alternative connection method.

**Plutonium Finishing Plant.** The contractor modified their approach and will require removal of additional high hazard glove boxes from the upper levels of the Plutonium Reclamation Facility prior to demolition. This action provides a more controlled approach and reduces material at risk during the demolition phase.

**Waste Feed Delivery.** The Tank Farms contractor issued their conclusions from accuracy and precision testing of a reconfigured sampler configuration to support Waste Treatment Plant feed qualification (see Activity Report 6/20/2014). Their conclusion was that the new configuration improved accuracy by approximately an order of magnitude for sample composition and density. The results also showed a substantial improvement in sample bias.

**Waste Treatment Plant.** ORP has directed BNI to evaluate open legacy (issued before 2010) conditions of approval (COAs) for previously approved safety basis documents and either submit documentation to support closure or state why they should remain open and provide anticipated actions to close the COAs. ORP's goal is to close legacy COAs by the end of the calendar year.

**Radiochemical Processing Laboratory (RPL).** A small fire at occurred at RPL during aerosol testing of HEPA filters and was rapidly extinguished by workers. No filters or other equipment were affected by the event.

An inventory of radiological material at Building 3410 last year uncovered discrepancies between the physical inventory and the tracking database. All of these items were discovered except one which is believed to be at RPL. The loss of material was not reported until six searches were completed over a period of nine months.