

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

August 26, 2016

**TO:** S. A. Stokes, Technical Director  
**FROM:** M. T. Sautman and Z. C. McCabe, Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending August 26, 2016

**H-Canyon:** The Target Residue Material (TRM) project contractor Readiness Assessment (RA) and the field portions of the DOE RA resumed this week following work on the truck well jib crane. The site representatives observed dry runs involving TRM container handling, removing the container retrieval system adapter from the cask, installing the upper impact limiter, and other activities to prepare the cask and ISO container for shipment.

The site representative observed crane operators remove fuel bundles from a railroad cask and insert the fuel bundles into the dissolver. Confirming the bundle identification of each bundle prior to dissolution is a key activity, but the writing on recent bundles has been very faint and/or hard to find. This confirmation is hindered because one of the main hot crane cameras will zoom, but not focus and the picture flickers frequently. A replacement camera is onsite and will be installed in the future. The crane operators repeatedly stopped worked when they could not clearly read the bundle identification written with a marker. Operations management and engineers made conservative decisions when trying to rotate the bundles to get a better view and when the bundle identification for one bundle could not be found initially.

**K-Area:** The Plutonium Down Blend project contractor RA began this week. The RA included three separate field evolutions including prepping the down blend cans with adulterant, adding plutonium oxide to the prepped cans, and the packaging and transportation of the pre- and post-blended plutonium within the facility. The site representative observed the first two field evolutions in tandem with the SRNS and DOE-SR personnel. Additionally, the site representative observed the control room response to a conduct of operations drill during the third evolution. The drill scenario involved an improperly packaged Criticality Control Overpack with down blended plutonium oxide inside. The site representative also observed interviews of K-Area operations personnel conducted by RA team members. The interview included questions concerning the controls credited in the new documented safety analysis and technical safety requirements scheduled to be implemented this fiscal year. The RA will continue next week.

SRNS intends to replace the fallen cement asbestos panels on the Assembly Area wall with reinforced fiberglass panels, overlay cracked panels with new panels, and to further secure existing panels to reduce the chance of additional panels falling. SRNS concluded that the siding does not have a safety significant function and plans to install the new panels as general service.

**Tritium Extraction Facility:** A site representative observed the removal of impact limiters from the legal weight truck (LWT) cask, the removal of the truck bay hatch plug, and transferring the LWT cask from the truck bed to the Cask Decontamination Area. When two riggers started to send hand signals to the truck bay crane operator, the Remote Handling Building lead stepped in and ensured only one person was sending hand signals.

**Training:** More than a year after it was proposed as a corrective action, DOE and SRNS approved the baseline change proposal to partially staff the Consolidated Drill Team with one manager and four drill controllers (see 7/17/15 and 4/29/16 weekly reports).